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INDAMI Presents...
The 4th Annual Latin American and 
Caribbean Summer Dance Institute
The next Summer Dance Institute is scheduled for June 25- 
July 1, 2001 and will feature Grupo Cultural Uk’ux Pop Wuj of 
Chichicastenango, Guatemala. Formed in 1991 with the mission 
of rescuing and fostering Mayan cultural traditions through a 
blend of dance and music, the company’s signature work, the 
Creation of Man, is based on the sacred book of the Maya 
Quiche, the Pop (time) Wuj (book). The piece follows the four 
stages of creation in accordance with Mayan belief-man of mud 
or clay, man of wood, monkey man and human beings. Other 
dances include the Deer Dance, the Courtship and Maize 
Sowing. The group has performed in New York, Mexico and 
throughout Guatemala.
In conjunction with the performance, Jan Hanvik, executive 
director of Pan American Musical Art Research in New York City 
and a Fulbright senior scholar in dance, will lecture on Mayan rit­
ual and culture. Hanvik has conducted field research in 
Guatemala and other Central and South American countries and 
is the author of many articles on Latin American dance.
The program also includes: 1) Technique classes in indigenous 
Bolivian folkloric dance, Haitian, Afro-Cuban, capoeira, and 
Caribbean dance and drumming with internationally recognized 
teachers and artists, including Ecuadorian choreographer Susanna 
Reyes; Caribbean choreographer Peter London, formerly of the 
Martha Graham Dance Company; Brazilian choreographer 
Giovanni Luquini; Bolivia Magica; and Louines Louinis of the 
Jean Leon Destine Haitian Dance Company. 2) Interdisciplinary, 
team-taught academic seminars in “Cultural Crosscurrents and 
Hybridity: Amerindians and Africans in the New World” and 
“Amerindian and African Dance and Culture in the New World” 
with FIU humanities and social science scholars. 3) Panel discus­
sions with distinguished artists and scholars in the field, including 
Allegra Fuller Snyder, Professor Emerita, University of California- 
Los Angeles. Courses may be taken for academic credit.
Produced in collaboration with the Florida Dance Association 
and the Florida Dance Festival, the Summer Dance Institute is 
co-sponsored by FIU’s Department of Theatre and Dance, 
African-New World Studies Program and Latin American and 
Caribbean Center. The Institute is a component of the “Dancing 
Across Disciplines” project funded by the US Department of 
Education’s Fund for the Improvement of Post-Secondary 
Education.
To find out more about Summer Dance Institute 2001 or other 
INDAMI programs, please contact: Niurca Marquez, Program 
Coordinator,, Intercultural Dance and Music Institute, Florida 
International University, Latin American and Caribbean Center, 
University Park, DM 353, Miami, Florida 33199, Phone: (305) 
348-2894, Fax: (305) 348-3593, E mail: indami@fiu.edu.
Grupo Cultural Uk’ux Pop Wuj was form ed  
in 1991 with the mission o f  rescuing and 
fostering Mayan cultural traditions through 
a blend o f  dance and music. The company’s 
signature work is based on the sacred book o f  
the Maya Quiche.
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F R O M  T H E  E D I T O R
More than 500 years after the great wave of European colonization of the Americas began, race remains a charged issue in many parts of the hemisphere. From the northern reaches of Canada to the tip of South America, modern societies struggle with the legacy of con­quered indigenous populations and African slavery. Resolving these internal tensions has taken on a new urgency as the regions economies move closer toward integration and globalization, putting new strains on marginalized communities and raising new questions about national 
identities.
The Iberian colonizers used a range of terms to describe every possible combination and degree of racial 
mixture. As David Howard shows in his article on the Dominican Republic, such distinctions continue 
there in somewhat different form today. Dominicans use a long list of terms to describe shades of skin color 
and avoid the still derogatory word, negro. Kathleen Bond and Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes document a 
similar situation in Brazil, where the ideal of “racial democracy” remains a myth to many Afro-Brazilians. 
Pan-black movements are working to instill a sense of pride and common identity in this community.
Marian Goslinga picks up this theme in her review of the works of Maryse Conde, an important 
Caribbean author. Goslinga traces the efforts of Caribbean intellectuals to develop theories of identity to 
encompass their legacy of slavery and colonization. As a black woman in a geographically, culturally and 
politically marginal world, Conde tackles interrelated issues of race, gender and class.
In Mexico, Ileana Schmidt-Dfaz de Leon discusses the government’s publication of free textbooks in 
indigenous languages and their implications for Indian identity. This issue’s photo essay also examines cul­
tural survival in a Mexican indigenous community. Children in an isolated Huichol Indian village in the 
mountains of Jalisco offer us a glimpse of their world through their own photographs.
The United States and Canada continue to come to terms with their own racial histories. In the spring of 
1999, Canada took a pioneering step toward autonomous government by indigenous peoples with the cre­
ation of the Nunavut Territory in the Arctic northeast. Two articles discuss the issues involved in this deci­
sion and the challenges the territory’s Inuit inhabitants face in the years ahead.
This issue also includes several reports on other topics with important consequences for the hemisphere. 
Canadian researchers Jean F. Mayer and Thomas Legler share their observations as “international visitors” 
during the summer 2000 Mexican elections. In the midst of widespread praise for the process that allowed 
an opposition figure to defeat the decades-old hegemony of the PRI, they raise some significant questions 
about Mexico’s electoral practices and their implications for democratic government. Democracy in Brazil is 
the main focus of Mariano Magalhaes’s article on civic participation and the role played by civil society in 
consolidating new democracies. Finally, FIUs Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina Rodrfguez-Acosta discuss the 
importance of strengthening local government in Latin America and the reasons why commitment to this 
goal has been fading in the last few years.
Thanks to all of the contributors who helped us put together this issue, sending us their work from as far 
away as Scotland, Brazil and the Canadian Arctic. The wide scope of the articles reflects Hemispheres com­
mitment to covering issues of importance throughout the Americas. I would like to extend my sincere 
appreciation to Alisa Newman, managing editor, and Pedro Botta, publications coordinator at LACC, for 
their never-ending commitment to Hemisphere over the years. This issue, in particular, carries the imprint of 
their dedication to this magazine and the intellectual curiosity that drives them to produce each issue.
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A Partial Victory
by Jean F. Mayer and Thomas Legler
The July 2000 victory of Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN) was a water­shed in Mexican poli­tics, ending 71 years of govern­
ment by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI). Both 
in Mexico and abroad, politicians, 
journalists and civil society repre­
sentatives were quick to proclaim 
this contest the most free and fair 
Mexican suffrage ever. But the his­
toric outcome of the election seems 
to have led most Mexican and for­
eign observers to forget about—or 
worse, to ignore—the various diffi­
culties that characterized this latest 
electoral process. The prevailing 
attitude seems to be that Fox’s vic­
tory and the relative cleanliness of 
the voting process are enough to 
complete Mexico’s transition to 
democracy.
While we share much of the 
enthusiasm surrounding the elec­
tions, we believe that the aggregate 
electoral trends and outcome at the 
national level hide significant and 
more substantive problems that are 
profoundly anchored in the coun­
try’s political regime and socioeco­
nomic system. These problems 
emerge most clearly in the Mexican 
countryside, especially in remote 
areas with a high concentration of 
indigenous population. In these 
zones, pre-electoral reports by such 
groups as Alianza Ci'vica, the 
National Democratic Institute, the 
Mexico Working Group and 
Global Exchange indicated that the 
months preceding Election Day 
were generally characterized by 
“business as usual”; that is, a con­
The months preceding Election Day were 
generally characterized by “business as 
usual”: a continuation of decades-old meth­
ods of intimidation and vote buying.
tinuation of decades-old methods 
of intimidation and vote buying.
Our own experience as interna­
tional visitors on hand for the elec­
tions in the state of Puebla allowed 
us to verify these observations and 
add to them. In particular, we 
were struck by the extent of confu­
sion among polling officials and 
the resulting disorder at many of 
the voting stations we visited. 
Ignorance of voting procedures 
appeared widespread among both 
polling officials and the electorate, 
contributing to a large number of 
irregularities in the voting process 
and compromising the secrecy of 
the vote. We were also able to wit­
ness firsthand indications of alleged 
vote buying and coercion before 
and during the process. These 
findings lead us to conclude that, 
while the 2 0 0 0  elections represent­
ed an important advance over pre­
vious electoral contests, Mexico 
still faces significant challenges in 
its path toward electoral democra­
cy.
T h e  V o t e  in  P u e b l a
Our group was comprised of five 
academics from Southern Ontario, 
Canada. We attended the 2000 
elections as international visitors 
invited by Alianza Ci'vica—a 
Mexican non-governmental organi­
zation dedicated to promoting free­
dom and secrecy in the voting 
process as well as civic education— 
and duly accredited with the 
Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). 
We stayed in Mexico for 10 days, 
focusing our observation effort on 
two mountainous areas of the cen­
tral state of Puebla: the Sierra 
Norte and the Zone of the 
Volcanoes, the communities 
around the Popocatepetl and 
Iztacci'huatl peaks. We observed 
the elections in a select group of 
predominantly indigenous and 
rural communities, including 
Tahitic in the Sierra Norte, and 
San Nicolas de los Ranchos, 
Santiago Xalitzintla, San Pedro 
Yancuitlapan and San Mateo 
Ozolco in the Zone of the 
Volcanoes. In both areas we visit­
ed, the voting was characterized by 
numerous irregularities and a gen­
eral lack of understanding of the 
electoral process, from both casilla 
(voting station) officials and voters 
at large. Voting secrecy was repeat­
edly compromised as a result.
On Election Day, none of the 
voting stations we observed opened 
on time— 8 : 0 0  a.m., as stipulated 
by electoral law—because of orga­
nizational problems. In fact, the 
first few hours of voting were 
marked by near pandemonium.
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Mexicans voted the PRI out o f  office, but electoral 
irregularities persist
Casilla officials were nervous and 
uncertain of the proper procedure 
for beginning the electoral process, 
and long lines of voters crowded 
the voting stations. Officials 
encountered many difficulties in 
assembling the voting booths and 
ballot boxes, as well as in unpack­
ing and preparing voting materials. 
In some cases they allowed voting 
to begin even though the casilla 
was clearly not ready to receive vot­
ers.
Many illiterate or semi-literate 
voters were unsure how to vote and 
often did not receive proper 
instructions from casilla officials. 
After leaving the voting booth and 
before depositing their ballots, 
many people either openly exhibit­
ed their votes or left their ballots 
unfolded in clear view of 
bystanders. Generally, PRI party 
representatives were the closest to 
the ballot boxes and made note of 
voters’ choices. On numerous 
occasions, two people entered the 
voting booth at the same time and 
communicated with each other. In 
several other instances, people out­
side the booths conversed at will 
with voters inside, sometimes 
instructing them directly on how 
to vote.
Such irregularities may be attrib­
uted to a lack of civic education or 
cultural elements, but they can also 
be interpreted as being part of a 
process of vote buying or intimida­
tion. We estimate that more than 
half of the ballots cast in the Sierra 
Norte and close to 20% in the 
Zone of the Volcanoes were visible 
to onlookers. In all cases, voting 
station officials or district IFE rep­
resentatives—when the latter were 
present—made little attempt to 
enforce voting secrecy. 
Confidentiality was also compro­
mised when strong winds lifted the 
protective curtain on flimsy voting 
booths located outside. On one 
occasion, the wind blew an entire 
booth away__
Many voting officials were clearly 
following directions and sugges­
tions from PRI party representa­
tives. Often, a PRI representative, 
instead of IFE officials, instructed 
voters to fold their ballots and put 
them in the ballot boxes. The 
effect was to cast doubt on the 
integrity of the voting process.
Despite the legal limit of two 
political party representatives per 
voting station, the PRI often had 
many more affiliates in and around 
the casillas. We noticed PRI mem­
bers and sympathizers sitting much 
too close to both the voting booths 
and ballot boxes, making it possi­
ble for them to see inside the 
booth and observe how people 
voted. These individuals were 
supervised by a PRI official who 
coordinated the activities of the 
party’s representatives at voting sta­
tions in the area. In the Sierra 
Norte, this person claimed to be 
part of Antorcha Campesina, a 
hard-line faction of the Mexican 
Peasant Confedera-tion, itself a sec­
tor of the PRI. Against this com­
manding local priista presence, 
there was generally only one PAN 
representative at each voting sta­
tion, and the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution (PRD) had 
only a sporadic presence. Other 
parties were not represented.
The counting of the ballots was 
generally disorganized but fair, 
although in Santiago Xalitzintla 
serious errors occurred in the tabu­
lation of the vote. There, PRI and 
PAN party representatives were 
allowed to participate in the count­
ing of ballots as well as handle them 
and instruct casilla officials about 
the process—a practice strictly for­
bidden by electoral law. Only the 
timely arrival of an IFE district offi­
cial allowed the vote count to con­
clude.
Two incidents confirmed that the 
elections in these communities 
occurred in a context of pressure 
and intimidation. First, in an age- 
old practice dubbed operation tamal, 
PRI supporters in Santiago 
Xalitzintla and San Nicolas de los 
Ranchos passed out free breakfasts 
and lunches to casilla officials and 
voters. Second, and of even more 
concern, we received compelling 
evidence of coaction y  compra, or 
vote buying and coercion. Three 
peasants approached us in Santiago 
Xalitzintla to make a formal denun­
ciation, alleging that in 250 cases 
they knew of (roughly a third of the 
electorate in that municipality), 
benefits from the government social 
assistance program PROGRESA 
had been conditioned on voting for 
the PRI. They complained that 
local PROGRESA officials had 
removed voter identification cards 
two weeks earlier and returned 
them just before Election Day after 
telling their owners that their names 
and voter numbers had been record­
ed to keep track of how they voted.
In addition to the troubling issues 
it raises, this episode confirms the
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The irregularities we witnessed in Puebla 
were replicated in other regions of Mexico, 
where they were sometimes much worse. In 
the state of Chiapas, for example, delega­
tions from US and Canadian NGOs were 
forcibly prevented from entering villages, 
received threats to their personal security, 
and were harassed by local police and para­
military forces.
usefulness of international 
observers—a subject of much 
debate lately. At the beginning of 
our trip to Mexico, one high-rank­
ing Canadian official stated that 
foreign observers would have little 
impact on the elections and that 
their presence was hardly necessary 
in the light of the tremendous pro­
cedural improvements recorded by 
the IFE in recent years. Our expe­
rience, however, suggests the con­
trary. In the case of the alleged 
PROGRESA abuses, the men who 
approached us clearly did not trust 
the local PRI-controlled authori­
ties. They would probably never 
have reported this serious irregular­
ity without our presence.
C o n t in u in g  O b s t a c l e s
In many ways, what we saw in 
Puebla contrasted with the national 
context. For example, voter 
turnout was less than 50% at the 
casillas we visited-—an abstention 
rate much higher than the 35% 
national average. Also, in the vot­
ing stations we observed, the PRI 
candidates for the presidency, 
Senate and Chamber of Deputies 
won by a margin of at least 2 : 1 , 
whereas at the national level, the 
PAN decisively won the presidency
and made a strong showing in both 
houses of Congress. (The IFE’s 
final results showed the PAN-led 
coalition with 39.5% of the con­
gressional vote, the PRI with 
37.4%, and the PRD-led alliance 
with 19.2%).
However, the irregularities we 
witnessed in Puebla were replicated 
in other regions of Mexico, where 
they were sometimes much worse. 
In the state of Chiapas, for exam­
ple, delegations from US and 
Canadian NGOs were forcibly pre­
vented from entering villages, 
received threats to their personal 
security, and were harassed by local 
police and paramilitary forces.
Based on our observations during 
this and previous stays, as well as 
on the pre-electoral reports men­
tioned above, we have identified 
three main concerns regarding the 
Mexican electoral process. The 
first involves vote buying and coer­
cion. The traditional practice of 
using public funds to support the 
electoral campaigns of political par­
ties in power continues and 
appears to involve all three major 
political formations. A special 
commission of the Chamber of 
Deputies formed to investigate the 
problem received 145 documented
denunciations of alleged misuse of 
public monies. In addition, an 
Alianza Ci'vica survey corroborated 
pre-electoral coercive practices that 
targeted public employees, obliging 
them to participate in PRI cam­
paign events.
A second concern is the lack of 
basic and civic education in many 
rural areas. Inadequate training of 
casilla officials, widespread igno­
rance of voting procedures among 
both polling officials and the elec­
torate, and the low level of basic lit­
eracy in many indigenous and/or 
rural communities contributed to 
produce confusion, disorder and 
numerous procedural irregularities.
Finally, access to the media 
remains an important issue.
Studies by the IFE and Alianza 
Ci'vica found national media cover­
age to be imbalanced, denying 
equal access and objective coverage 
to all parties.
Underscoring these irregularities 
and procedural problems is not 
meant to detract from the signifi­
cant advances made in Mexico’s 
transition to democracy. Beginning 
in 1977, and especially during the 
1990s, numerous electoral reforms 
facilitated the development of polit­
ical pluralism and improved the 
conditions conducive to free and 
fair elections. Since 1996, when it 
became fully autonomous and 
operational, the IFE’s role in pro­
moting free and fair elections has 
been widely recognized in and out­
side Mexico, and polls show that 
most Mexicans today believe that 
elections are an important mecha­
nism for democratic development. 
The 2000 electoral process high­
lighted the tremendous work 
accomplished in the past few years 
by the IFE, as well as by the 
numerous Mexican NGOs devoted 
to the cause of free and fair voting, 
civic education and citizen partici­
pation in the political process.
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Clearly, Mexico’s electoral process 
has undergone significant improve­
ments since the controversial 1988 
elections. Voter registration, the 
impartiality of electoral institu­
tions, the counting of votes, plural­
ism of political groups, and alter­
nation among political parties have 
all become generally reliable and 
effective. Nonetheless, numerous 
elements still require improvement 
for Mexico to have truly free, fair 
and transparent elections.
R e m a r k s  a n d  R e c o m m e n d a t io n s
Fox’s victory has already generat­
ed significant political change in 
Mexico, not least the painful and 
much-debated restructuring of the 
PRI and PRD. Nevertheless, the 
country’s transition to a reliable, 
effective electoral democracy 
remains to be completed.
Important deficiencies in the 
Mexican electoral process persist, 
despite significant improvements 
over the past 20 years. We believe 
that the government, political par­
ties, electoral authorities and civil 
society must address such deficien­
cies before future elections for 
Mexico truly to accomplish its 
transition to an electoral democra- 
Cy'
In particular, our observations 
confirmed the persistent urban/ 
rural divide in Mexico. Elections 
in Mexico’s cities generally have 
become routine and reliable exer­
cises in suffrage. In the country­
side, however, especially in margin­
al, indigenous zones, election pro­
cedures are less dependable. 
Problems range from poorly 
trained and educated voting offi­
cials and voters to vote buying and 
intimidation.
For electoral democracy to 
extend adequately to rural Mexico, 
significant changes must be made 
on two fronts. First, improvements 
in education and training are cru­
cial. Current civic and political 
education programs, such as the 
ones undertaken by the IFE and 
Alianza Ci'vica, should be extended 
to rural and indigenous communi­
ties, where this type of training is 
particularly lacking. Greater efforts 
must be made to ensure that basic 
general and civic education reaches 
rural and/or indigenous communi­
ties, and the communication gap 
between indigenous languages and 
the current IFE training programs, 
which are predominantly in 
Spanish, must be breached. On 
the one hand, the IFE must reori­
ent its spending priorities toward 
rural civic education and election 
training. We were struck, for 
example, by the contrast between 
the resources the IFE dedicated to 
such activities as hosting interna­
tional visitors or launching ad cam­
paigns and its weak presence in 
rural zones. On the other hand, the 
Secretariat of Public Education 
must renew efforts to expand liter­
acy in Mexico’s poorer rural zones.
Second, advances in electoral 
democracy in the countryside are 
impeded by persistent and unac- 
ceptably high levels of poverty. 
Poverty, ultimately, is the feeding 
ground of an anti-democratic polit­
ical culture of clientelism manifest­
ed in fear, vote buying and intimi­
dation. During the 71 years of 
PRI rule, voting in poor areas 
became a question of survival. 
Election time represented a period­
ic opportunity for impoverished 
voters to exchange their votes for 
concrete material benefits from the 
ruling party, ranging from cash, 
agricultural credit and debt forgive­
ness to building supplies and rural 
electrification. In the 2000 elec­
tion, the PROGRESA and PRO- 
CAMPO social assistance programs 
continued the tradition of exchang­
ing votes for goods and services.
The PRI will relinquish the pres­
idency in December 2000, but the 
party retains much of its strength 
at the state and local levels. In 
addition, both the PAN and PRD 
have recently come under allega­
tions of manipulating state-run 
programs and public monies in the 
states and municipalities under 
their control. One of the most 
important challenges for Fox’s 
administration will be to thwart 
the use of state patronage and coer­
cion by political parties and 
caciques (local bosses). To achieve 
these goals, basic and civic educa­
tion must be improved dramatical­
ly and poverty alleviated substan­
tially, especially in rural areas.
These problems are complex and 
will require long-term strategies 
and commitment on the part of 
the federal government. Unless the 
social and economic condition of 
Mexico’s poor population is 
improved significantly in the next 
few years, the irregularities we 
observed in the July 2000 elections 
are likely to reoccur in the future. 
Much work remains to be done 
before electoral democracy is effec­
tively consolidated in Mexico. ■
Jean F. M ayer is assistant professor o f  
po litica l science at the University o f  
Guelph, Ontario. Thomas Legler is 
assistant professor o f  political science 
at the University o f  Victoria, British 
Columbia. This article is based on a 
report originally prepared with the 
help ofN ibaldo Galleguillos, Mark 
Juhasz, Marie-Josee Massicotte and  
Erin McCaughan.
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Building Partnerships
by Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina Rodriguez-Acosta
A mong the many issues under discussion at the
1998 Summit of the 
Americas in Santiago, 
Chile, local governance 
was high on the agenda. The Plan of 
Action signed by the leaders of the 
34 participating countries included 
several objectives designed to 
strengthen local government, reflect­
ing the Summit’s recognition of the 
growing significance of local govern­
ment in Latin America and the 
important role it can play in devel­
opment. In the past few years, how­
ever, this growth has shown signs of 
reversing, or at least slowing down. 
Across the hemisphere, countries are 
witnessing a decline in commitment 
to strong, efficient and productive 
subnational governments.
Ironically, this trend comes in the 
aftermath of widespread praise for 
Latin America’s progress in the area 
of local governance, an example that 
has been emulated in other parts of 
the world. Eastern Europe, Africa 
and even China are turning their 
attention to questions of decentral­
ization and building the capacity of 
their subnational governments. In so 
doing, they are drawing inspiration 
from a Latin American model that, 
at least for the moment, appears to 
be running out of steam. Some crit­
ics, especially those in national gov­
ernments, seem to believe that 
stronger local governments come at 
the expense of weaker national gov­
ernments. This argument fails to 
understand that strengthening one or 
another level of government does not 
represent a zero sum game, in the 
sense that if one level of government 
is enhanced, another will inevitably
become weaker. Rather, contempo­
rary experience demonstrates clearly 
that when one level of government 
becomes institutionally stronger and 
more competent, other existing levels 
f government will inevitably do the 
same.
One of the most important bene­
fits of stronger subnational govern­
ments is their ability to generate eco­
nomic development at the local level. 
Successful economic development 
requires locally focused and targeted 
support to establish necessary infra­
structure and create an environment 
conducive to economic development. 
This is achieved much more readily 
by officials on the scene, who are 
located in the community and pos­
sess the autonomy and the resources 
to respond to the legitimate develop­
ment needs of the private sector.
This relationship becomes clear if 
one examines the data on levels of 
subnational expenditure and employ­
ment on a regional basis around the 
world. In Europe, Japan and North 
America—the most economically 
developed regions of the world— 
56% of all governmental expenditure 
and public employment occurs at the 
subnational level. In contrast, in 
Africa—the least economically 
developed region of the world—only 
6 % to 1 0 % of government employ­
ment and expenditure occurs at the 
subnational level. The figures are 
approximately 20% for Latin 
America and 30% for Asia. Thus, it 
is not surprising that the country in 
Eastern Europe credited with the 
most successful economic transition 
is the same one that has devoted the 
most attention to building and 
strengthening the capacity of its sub­
national governments: Poland. Nor 
is it surprising that when the now 
vibrant Swedish economy began to 
take a downturn a decade ago, a 
main focus of reform efforts was 
enhancing the capacity of Sweden’s 
already strong subnational govern­
ments.
Of special importance for develop­
ing countries, the strengthening of 
subnational governments (and, by 
extension, local economic develop­
ment capacity) may also be a signifi­
cant step in dealing with the growing 
problem of income inequality, which 
the Inter-American Development 
Bank’s 1999 annual development 
report identified as among the most 
potentially destabilizing forces in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Locally elected officials, who are 
dependent upon local voters, must, 
of necessity, be responsive to the 
most basic needs of their communi­
ties.
Despite these clear benefits, 
reformers who support the move­
ment toward stronger subnational 
government in the hemisphere 
recently have encountered a growing 
disinclination on the part of national 
governments to adequately and effec­
tively support the strengthening of 
government at this level. In fact, 
national officials seem to have been a 
good deal more committed to 
strengthening local government a 
decade ago than they are today. One 
possible reason for this trend is the 
recent tendency of reformers con­
cerned about these matters to focus 
almost exclusively on the activities of 
local officials in encouraging the 
development of subnational govern­
ments, instead of working jointly at
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the local and national levels. In most 
cases, one cannot build subnational 
governments simply by working in 
the subnational context. This is 
especially true in countries with long 
traditions of centralism, where politi­
cal, economic and administrative 
power is concentrated at the national 
level.
The growing tendency of reform­
ers to ignore the need for an active 
role for the national government, 
and the growing inclination of 
national governments to lessen their 
commitment to strengthening 
administration at the local level, is in 
part a result of prior success and its 
political consequences. Many local 
governments—especially, large capi­
tal city governments—have become 
important political bases in their 
own right. In some cases, most 
recently Argentina, the mayors of 
capital cities have successfully run for 
president as opposition candidates.
Those realities should not encour­
age reformers to neglect efforts to 
maintain a partnership between local 
and national officials. In most 
instances, the national government 
not only establishes the policy frame­
work within which local govern­
ments must function, but also exer­
cises overwhelming control over the 
fiscal resources available to govern­
ment at all levels. If progress in the 
development of subnational govern­
ments is to continue, a renewed 
effort must be made to encourage 
and engage national leadership. An 
important part of these efforts is 
stressing the economic development 
role of local governments.
Efforts to strengthen local govern­
ment have also failed to focus ade­
quately on issues of sustainability. 
International organizations and 
donors must bear some portion of 
the responsibility. All too often, 
donors tend to support short-term 
reform projects that can produce 
quick results. Our personal experi­
ence as advisors to the local govern­
ment of one Latin American city is a 
case in point. Two separate mayors 
attempted to reform that city’s budg­
etary and financial management pro­
cedures. In each case, the effort was 
supported by a different internation­
al donor, and in each instance the 
results were the same: Short-term 
assistance was provided for major 
reforms that rapidly enhanced man­
agement capacity and dramatically 
tightened executive control over 
agency spending. The donor then 
ended assistance. Shortly thereafter, 
the reforms put in place evaporated 
amidst political and fiscal pressures 
on the municipal government. A 
short-term focus fails to recognize 
that serious systemic reform requires 
a great deal of time. In the United 
States, for example, systematic efforts 
at encouraging local government 
reform and professionalization began 
in the 1880s, but real success was 
not achieved on a broad basis until 
the 1950s. Attempts to professional­
ize the civil service and eliminate 
patronage in the US have taken at 
least as long to achieve.
A related problem is the tendency 
of donors and international assis­
tance agencies to provide mostly 
short-term training for local officials. 
Less support is granted for longer- 
term professionalization, such as the 
development of university-based pro­
grams in local government manage­
ment. Longer-term programs are 
essential for the development of a 
permanent culture of professional­
ism.
Finally, those who support reform 
efforts (in particular, international 
organizations and donors) tend to 
forget that the kind of change that is 
needed goes well beyond administra­
tive and fiscal concerns but is, in 
fact, political as well. It is necessary 
to work with the political leadership 
both nationally and locally to bring 
about important, meaningful and
sustainable change. Perhaps because 
so much international technical assis­
tance and support is overseen by 
mid-level administrators and man­
agers, technical assistance efforts tend 
to work at similar levels in the coun­
tries where activities are supported.
In many cases there is, below the sur­
face, a very real antagonism toward 
working with political officials— 
even at the local level. Often, donor 
officials will publicly heap praise on 
the results of projects that support 
local government, while at the same 
time privately criticizing the projects 
for having had too much contact 
with high-level political officials and, 
as a consequence, assuming too high 
a profile.
Especially in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, the kind of long-term 
changes that are necessary to imple­
ment the goals of the Summit Plan 
of Action require the full involve­
ment of top-level political officials. 
This involvement cannot be 
obtained by ignoring or avoiding 
these officials in the process of seek­
ing meaningful institutionalized 
reform. Rather, efforts must be 
made to engage political leadership 
at all levels in not only supporting, 
but being a part of—and indeed, 
even leading—this process. ■
Allan Rosenbaum and Cristina 
Rodriguez-Acosta are director and 
deputy director, respectively, o f  the 
Institute fo r  Public Management and  
Community Service at Florida 
International University’s College o f  
Health and Urban Affairs. This arti­
cle is based on a report originally sub­
mitted to the Special Committee on 
Inter-American Summits Management 
o f  the Permanent Council o f  the 
Organization o f  American States.
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Civic Participation in Brazil
by Mariano J. Magalhaes
A  decade and a half after the massive popular uprising in favor of direct presidential elec­tions (the diretasjd 
movement), and despite the impres­
sive “March of 100,000” on Brasilia 
in August 1999, Brazilian citizens 
have a low rate of participation in 
political life. The strength of civil 
society will not make or break 
democracy in Brazil, but anemic 
popular participation in associations, 
movements and organizations lessens 
the quality of representative democ­
racy there.
Many scholars have argued that a 
strong civil society makes for a 
strong democracy. In countries 
around the world, civil society often 
provides the force behind the initial 
decision of authoritarian regimes to 
move toward democracy or pick up 
the pace of democratic reform.
Brazil is only one example of this 
trend. Popular uprisings in 
Indonesia in early 1998 led to the 
fall of the Suharto regime; grass-roots 
movements in the early 1990s pres­
sured the Mexican government to 
make elections more open and com­
petitive; the Eastern European demo­
cratic transitions were in part spurred 
by social forces; and in the late 1970s 
and into the 1980s, the Madres de la 
Plaza de Mayo kept the heat on 
Argentina’s military government to 
come clean on its deadly campaign 
to wipe out subversive movements 
during that country’s “dirty war.”
The level at which the population 
participates in organized collective 
action greatly impacts the quality of 
democracy. Although levels of popu­
lar participation can be expected to
shift over time in response to 
changes in the substance and intensi­
ty of societal conflict, as well as the 
stage of democratization, widespread 
participation in a rich set of associa­
tions and organizations enables peo­
ple to advance their interests in the 
political arena. The process of dem­
ocratic consolidation, however, 
marks the point at which the politi­
cal system begins to settle into more 
routinized patterns of conflict that 
encourage individuals to “free-ride” 
on the efforts of others. Scholars 
expect to find decreased popular par­
ticipation in associational life in most 
newly democratic states, and that is 
certainly the case in Brazil.
M e m b e r sh ip  in  A ss o c ia t io n s
Brazilian associations have experi­
enced a general decline in member­
ship since the mid 1980s, the high 
point of political participation. In 
1985, a survey conducted by the 
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande 
do Sul found that almost 40% of 
adult residents of that Brazilian state 
were members of at least one associa­
tion. Nine years later, the number 
had declined to less than 30%.
Although the sample came from a 
single state, the results have mostly 
been confirmed across the country. 
The major reason for the weakness 
of civil society in Brazil is the inabili­
ty of the vast number of uneducated 
poor to articulate their demands 
effectively. In northeastern Brazil, 
especially, the level of participation of 
poor residents in neighborhood and 
church-based organizations has 
declined significantly since the 
1970s. The northeast is the poorest 
region in Brazil and has suffered
tremendously since market reforms 
were introduced in the early 1990s. 
Income distribution, already skewed 
in favor of the rich, grew even more 
unequal in the first half of that 
decade. The educational level also 
declined, making it easy to under­
stand decreased participation in poli­
tics in general, and associations in 
particular.
More surprising are the survey data 
from Rio Grande do Sul, one of 
Brazil’s most developed states. 
Although it also suffered the negative 
short-term consequences of national 
economic reforms, Rio Grande do 
Sul saw its share of the national eco­
nomic wealth increase from 1 0 % in 
1985 to 12% in 1995. Educational 
levels have remained constant since 
the 1980s. The decline in associa­
tional life in this state seems to fit 
the prediction that after the euphoria 
of the transition to civilian govern­
ment, people in neodemocracies 
begin to settle into their new lives 
and are less likely to join associa­
tions.
Aside from the importance of 
political participation for democratic 
governance, many scholars argue that 
membership in associations fosters 
democratic attitudes. According to 
this logic, strengthening civil society 
is tantamount to deepening demo­
cratic political culture. We can test 
this theory by examining whether 
Brazilians who are members of asso­
ciations exhibit more democratic 
attitudes than Brazilians who are not 
affiliated with any association.
The sample of interviews from Rio 
Grande do Sul provides some evi­
dence for the positive connection 
between membership in associations
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T a b l e  1. P e r c e n t a g e  o f  R e s p o n d e n t s  in  R i o  G r a n d e  d o  S u l  
A g r e e in g  w i t h  S t a t e m e n t , b y  M e m b e r s h ip  in  A s s o c ia t i o n  (1994)
Member Nonmember
I influence politics 44 30**
I trust our system of justice 29 23
The country would be better 
off with only one political party 39 55**
Things will only get better with 
a revolution or through violence 30 27
Voting is very important 83 75*
Under military rule the 
country was better off 40 4 5 **
N=609
Source: Nticleo d e Pesquisas e Documenta^ao da Politica Rio Grandense, Universidade Federal 
do Rio Grande do Sul. I  w ou ld  like to thank Professor M arcelo Baquero f o r  this data.
* sign ifican t a t . 1 lev e l (tw o-ta il test)
** sign ifican t a t  .01 lev e l (ttvo-ta il test)
and democratic norms. The survey 
revealed a sizable (and statistically 
significant) difference between mem­
bers and nonmembers in terms of 
perceived political efficacy. Of the 
entire sample, only a third of the 
respondents believed that they influ­
enced politics. The implication was 
that most Brazilians believed that 
nothing much had changed after 
more than 1 0  years of democratic 
elections. Corruption was more 
widespread, if anything, and only 
one in every 1 0  gauchos (residents of 
Rio Grande do Sul) trusted elected 
officials. Despite changing economic 
fortunes beginning in summer 1994, 
citizens were skeptical of the options 
available to them in the upcoming 
elections, and probably of the elec­
tions themselves.
Effective and stable democratic
government hinges in part on the 
level of confidence in state institu­
tions. The lack of trust in the 
Brazilian judicial system reported in 
the Rio Grande do Sul survey by 
both members and nonmembers of 
associations should come as no sur­
prise. Historically, the judicial 
branch in Brazil has enjoyed very lit­
tle public support. More often than 
not, the politically well placed and 
economically well off receive a slap 
on the wrist, if they are brought to 
justice at all. The absence of the rule 
of law in Brazil is a key obstacle to 
democratic consolidation. Citizens 
need to know that they can turn to 
the courts to defend themselves 
against the state, its officials and 
other powerful actors. The survey 
found even lower levels of public 
trust in the police: 15% and 1 2 %,
respectively, for members and non­
members. This lack of confidence in 
public institutions at the local and 
national levels threatens the quality 
of democracy in Brazil.
Preference for a multiparty system 
varied between the two groups of 
respondents. Less then half of gau­
chos who were members of associa­
tions felt that the country would be 
better served by a one-party system, 
compared to more than half of non­
members. The preference for more 
parties among members of associa­
tions may be explained in part by the 
fact that associational life produces 
awareness of the importance of open 
competition for public power and 
the proper functioning of democratic 
government. Of the entire sample, 
50% supported a one-party system.
In a study published in the 
American Political Science Review in 
September 1994, Edward Muller and 
Mitchell Seligson found that public 
support for gradual reform has a 
greater positive impact on change in 
democracy than does support for 
revolutionary change or intransigent 
defense of the status quo. They also 
found that public support for grad­
ual reform is positively correlated 
with other democratic attitudes. 
Therefore, associational life should 
have a negative impact on support 
for violent change. In Rio Grande 
do Sul, this was not the case. 
Associational membership in the 
sample was correlated (albeit not sig­
nificantly) with greater support for 
political change through violent 
means. The data suggest that partic­
ipation in civil society does not influ­
ence whether individuals will prefer 
incremental change over revolution­
ary change or defense of the status 
quo.
In an earlier round of interviews in 
Rio Grande do Sul in 1985, respon­
dents were asked whether quebra- 
quebras (activities such as overturning 
vehicles and arson) were acceptable
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means for confronting public 
authorities. Almost 90% answered 
no. How can the difference between 
1985 and 1994 be explained? One 
possibility is that the expectations 
and euphoria associated with the 
transition to democracy convinced 
most people that these actions were 
unnecessary. A second potential 
explanation for the change between 
1985 and 1994 is the wording of 
the question. In the later question­
naire, respondents were not provid­
ed with examples of violent methods 
for seeking political change.
Without visualizing the options, 
respondents may have been more 
likely to condone violent upheaval.
A third possibility that follows the 
chronological logic of the first is that 
the inept government of Jose Sarney, 
the corruption of Fernando Collor 
de Melo and the incompetence of 
Itamar Franco—not to mention the 
generalized perception that democ­
racy, mainly elections, had not done 
much to improve most people’s 
lives—could have fueled the belief 
that positive change would only be 
possible through “nondemocratic” 
means. These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive and may in fact 
have worked together to account for 
the change between surveys.
A further concern in consolidating 
democracy is a healthy attitude 
toward voting. If public regard for 
voting reaches very low levels, voting 
will decline to the point that the 
ability of society to hold elected offi­
cials accountable is seriously under­
mined. In Brazil, voting is manda­
tory. This may account for the 
results in the table above, in which 
both members and nonmembers 
considered voting to be very impor­
tant (although the rate was higher 
among members than nonmem­
bers). To dismiss this hypothesis, 
respondents in Rio Grande do Sul 
were asked if they would vote even if 
they were not required to do so.
More than 70% of members said 
yes, compared to 63% of nonmem­
bers. The results underline the 
importance of voting in the eyes of 
the public, as well as confirming the 
difference between members and 
nonmembers.
The survey also looked at public 
support for military rule; specifically, 
whether the country was better or 
worse off during this period. This 
question captures Samuel 
Huntington’s notion of “authoritari­
an nostalgia,” which he claims actu­
ally increases the prospects for dem­
ocratic consolidation. One can 
argue that longing for a nondemoc­
ratic regime is not good for demo­
cratic political socialization. If citi­
zens do not perceive democracy as 
the most appropriate form of gov­
ernment before “procedural” legiti­
macy sets in, antidemocratic 
forces—the military, in most Latin 
American countries—are likely to 
take this cue and perhaps intervene 
more openly in politics, to the detri­
ment of the democratic allocation of 
public values. Members could be 
expected to have a more negative 
evaluation of military rule than non­
members, and in fact, 40% of mem­
bers reported that the country was 
better off under the military, com­
pared to almost half of nonmem­
bers.
Two factors stand out in the data. 
First, although this information was 
not included in the table, one-fifth 
of nonmembers were unsure about 
which regime was better for the 
country, compared to less than 1 0 % 
of members. This finding may be 
spurious; lack of education may con­
tribute to the uncertainty of non­
members, while conversely, member­
ship in associational life is highly 
correlated with education.
The second outstanding factor is 
the high level of agreement that the 
country was better off under mili­
tary rule. Although it would be a
leap to imply that the respondents 
preferred military rule to democracy, 
the survey’s findings corroborate the 
conclusions of other studies. Juan 
Linz and Alfred Stepan found that 
in the early 1990s, Brazilians sup­
ported democracy at a frighteningly 
lower rate than citizens of other 
countries studied. Forty percent of 
Brazilians preferred democracy to 
any other form of government, com­
pared to 73% of Uruguayans, 70% 
of Spaniards, 61% of Portuguese 
and 87% of Greeks.
C iv il  S o c ie t y
Civil society in Brazil is weak.
The lack of associational life in Rio 
Grande do Sul is particularly telling; 
given this state’s characteristics, we 
could expect it to have higher rates 
of participation. In a presentation at 
a conference in Brasilia in December 
1998, political scientist Philip 
Oxhorn told the audience that the 
key to the health of Brazilian 
democracy was a strong civil society. 
In practice, however, civil society 
organizations in Brazil are con­
strained by a lack of available 
resources. The situation will not 
improve significantly without a 
helping hand from the government.
Strengthening civil society in 
Brazil will require a more serious 
commitment on the part of 
President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso and the help of a national 
legislature that has been reluctant to 
go along with the president’s propos­
als since his re-election in October 
1998. The challenge for Brazil’s 
leaders is to overcome partisan 
squabbles to create a legal and social 
environment more conducive to citi­
zen participation. ■
Mariano J. Magalha.es is assistant pro­
fessor o f  political science at Roosevelt 
University.
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Black Into...Black
by Kathleen Bond
I
n 1997, Margarida Pereira da 
Silva was the leading candi­
date for mayor of Pombal, a 
city in the interior of the 
northeastern Brazilian state of 
Parafba. Pereira da Silva, beloved 
for her community work with 
youth, decided to run for office to 
offer an alternative to corrupt, spe­
cial interest politics. She had little 
money, so she ran the campaign 
from her home. One week before 
Election Day, two strangers offered 
her the equivalent of $7 5 , 0 0 0  as a 
donation for her youth program. 
There was just one condition—she 
had to drop out of the race. She 
politely but firmly refused, telling 
the visitors, “I’m running for my 
people, not for money.”
Days after she refused the bribe, 
all of Pereira da Silva’s campaign 
posters were painted over with the 
words nega fe ia  (ugly black 
woman). Unable to discredit her 
honesty or merits, her opponents 
orchestrated a smear campaign that 
focused solely on race. Long-time 
friends and even some relatives, 
who she believes were paid off, sud­
denly turned against her. Her 
nephew caught his girlfriend tear­
ing down Pereira da Silva’s posters. 
When he confronted her, the girl 
replied, “I’m not going to waste my 
vote on that ugly black thing.” 
Pereira da Silva lost by a landslide.
Stories of racial discrimination 
like this one are not confined to the 
rural northeast. Millions of Afro- 
Brazilians experience racism every 
day. From the family living room, 
where lighter-skinned children are 
often favored over their darker sib­
lings, to church pews, barbershops,
The lack o f  educational materials about Afro-Brazilian history and culture rein­
forces negative images o f  blackness among school children. Photo: Kathleen Bond.
14 Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
U R E
The battle over racial identity in Brazil
Brazil is often described as a “racial democ­
racy” because of the high number of interra­
cial marriages and easy banter between the 
races in everyday life. Nothing could be far­
ther from the truth.
classrooms and the halls of 
Congress, racism gnaws at the fab­
ric of Brazilian society. The coun­
try is often described by foreigners 
and Brazilians as a “racial democra­
cy” because of the high number of 
interracial marriages and seemingly 
easy banter between the races in 
everyday life. Nothing could be 
farther from the truth.
A  L e g a c y  o f  D i s c r im in a t io n
Racial democracy, a term coined 
by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto 
Freyre in the early twentieth centu­
ry, is the theory that Brazil’s history 
of extended miscegenation has 
resulted in a cultural melange in 
which all races are equally valued.
In reality, however, race in Brazil is 
a complex and difficult issue. 
Although most Brazilians claim a 
mixed African, European and 
indigenous ancestry, the weight of 
racism causes many to “whiten” 
themselves. Many morenos straight­
en their hair and search for lighter­
skinned marriage partners. They 
often identify themselves and each 
other with terms that indicate a 
lighter skin tone, such as 
moreninho, cafe, mulato, bronzeado 
and escurinho. Rarely will they 
describe themselves as negro. Even
those who call themselves black 
often have a hard time convincing 
other Brazilians not to identify 
them as moreno or mulato. For 
many people, to be called black is 
still an insult.
Skin color profoundly influences 
life chances. According to a 1992 
study by Carlos Hasenbalg and 
Nelson do Valle Silva, nonwhite 
Brazilian are three times more likely 
than whites to be illiterate. The 
numbers deteriorate even further at 
higher educational levels: Whites 
are five times more likely than peo­
ple of mixed ancestry and nine 
times more likely than blacks to 
obtain university degrees. The pat­
tern repeats itself in the work force, 
where, according to government 
statistics, whites have access to the 
highest-paying jobs, earning up to 
75% more than blacks and 50% 
more than people of mixed ances­
try. Other socioeconomic indica­
tors are no less grim. Infant mor­
tality statistics are almost twice as 
high for nonwhite children, and the 
vast majority of detainees in the 
country’s crowded prison system are 
nonwhites.
Not all of the consequences of 
racism can be neatly packaged into 
statistics and charts. Effects on self­
esteem are not so easily measured. 
At a recent reflection group of 
Afro-Brazilian women in Joao 
Pessoa, the capital of Parafba, a 
woman named Cida painfully 
recounted the end of her relation­
ship with Chico, a lighter-skinned 
black. The two had dated for sev­
eral years without their color differ­
ence seeming to create any difficul­
ties. When they got engaged, how­
ever, Chico’s family exploded.
“This little blackie is going to pol­
lute our blood. Go and find some­
one who will purify it,” Chico’s 
mother raged. Chico caved in and 
broke off the engagement within 
days. Two years later, Cida painful­
ly asked the group, “How can you 
tell me not to feel inferior because 
of my color?”
R e c l a i m in g  I d e n t it ie s
Brazil’s black movement struggles 
to address this question by intro­
ducing positive images of black 
identity and fighting racism at all 
levels of society. Anthropologist 
John Burdick traces the movement’s 
momentum to the 1970s, when a 
generation of nonwhite students 
was caught in the contradiction 
between the promise of upward 
mobility and the reality of labor 
and educational barriers. Around 
the world, revolutionaries in the 
former Portuguese colonies of 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and 
Angola and militants in the Black 
Power movement in the United 
States offered encouraging symbols 
of self-confidence for the fledgling 
Afro-Brazilian movement.
Over the past 25 years, the black 
movement in Brazil has developed
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Paraiba Black Movement participants celebrate the many shades o f  their African heritage. Photo: Kathleen Bond.
in different directions. Some 
groups dedicate their energy to 
judicial and legislative arenas, such 
as the enforcement of the 1989 
Cao law that makes racism a crime. 
Other organizations—including the 
internationally acclaimed percus­
sion band Olodum—focus on cul­
tural programs. Various research 
institutes, primarily in Rio de 
Janeiro and Sao Paulo, cater to the 
middle class, while Catholic church 
groups, most notably the Agentes 
de Pastoral Negro (Black Pastoral 
Church Workers), offer educational 
courses for the economically disad­
vantaged.
The black movement in Parafba 
reflects this diversity. Participating 
organizations include Caiana dos 
Crioulos, a black community of
descendants of runaway slaves; 
Banda Yle Odara and other musi­
cal, martial arts and dance groups; 
Afro-Brazilian religious groups, 
including Candomble and 
Umbanda centers; women’s reflec­
tion groups; coalition and organiz­
ing entities, including the Agentes 
de Pastoral Negro; and educational 
groups that focus on literacy pro­
grams, training and school curricu­
lum development. These groups 
gather every year for the annual 
Parafba Black Movement 
Conference.
In addition to gaining new 
insights into cultural, religious and 
political resistance, coming together 
in solidarity is an important aspect 
of the conference. In rural regions 
of Brazil, blacks are often isolated.
They suffer intense discrimination, 
especially in the school system. 
Paulo Cesar, a 26-year-old commu­
nity activist, told a story that 
echoed the childhood experiences 
of many participants. His junior 
high school in rural Parafba had 
only three or four black students. 
When he was called negao besta 
(big, stupid black), his teacher 
refused to intervene. His mother, 
lacking formal education and self- 
confidence, did nothing when he 
came home from school crying. 
“That experience left a profound 
mark,” Cesar stated. “My involve­
ment with the black movement 
reinforces in me that being black is 
not horrible, it’s being human like 
any other person.” He now directs 
a capoeira group (a combination of
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martial arts and dance practiced by 
slaves to train for escapes) and holds 
workshops on racism in local 
schools.
Activists have reached out to the 
interior of the state, where 
Tanzanian Maryknoll Sister Efu 
Nyaki and her Brazilian colleagues 
travel extensively throughout the 
drought-stricken, poor countryside 
offering two-day formation courses 
in identity, self-esteem and empow­
erment. During these visits, Nyaki 
discovered an abysmally low educa­
tional level among most blacks in 
the interior. “We’ve been to all­
black rural communities where only 
one or two people are literate, which 
has led us to seek funding to begin 
small literacy programs,” she com­
mented.
Lagoa Rac^ a, 10 hours from the 
state capital, is one of those commu­
nities. Five years ago, when Nyaki’s 
team first visited the community, it 
had no school within walking dis­
tance. Only one of the 200 resi­
dents could read and write. With 
help from outside, that man was 
trained to offer adult literacy cours­
es, and eventually a school was built 
to serve the community. “There are 
Lagoa Ra^as all over the northeast,” 
Nyaki lamented. “The government 
has simply abandoned these people.”
Educational work is also under­
way in urban areas of Parafba, where 
activists such as Nyaki offer pro­
grams on racism and Afro-Brazilian 
identity in the schools. Very few 
children admit to being black when 
the question is posed at the begin­
ning of the sessions. The complete 
lack of educational material about 
Afro-Brazilian history and culture 
reinforces negative images of black­
ness among school children. Nyaki’s 
team is working with black universi­
ty professors to develop a primary 
school curriculum that includes the 
history and achievements of black 
Brazilians.
R e l i g i o u s  D ia l o g u e
Black activism has also affected 
the church, bringing black mem­
bers of religious orders together for 
reflection. Parafba’s GRENI 
(Group of Black and Indigenous 
Religious) is one such group.
These small clusters of Catholic 
priests and nuns are beginning the 
process of reclaiming their black 
and indigenous identities. Many 
participants find strength in the 
groups to face racism in their own 
religious communities.
Catholics are not just talking to 
each other about racial issues. Over 
the last decade, some have attempt­
ed a dialogue with Afro-Brazilian 
religious groups. Many of these 
groups have suffered discrimination 
throughout Brazilian history, much 
of it condoned by the Catholic 
Church. For example, until the 
1950s, acts of destruction against 
Candomble houses of worship by 
either the police or common citi­
zens were never punished by law. 
Long after the practice of Afro- 
Brazilian religions was legalized in 
the early 1970s, participants were 
required to request permission from 
local authorities on the day of wor­
ship. To this day, many people dis­
miss Afro-Brazilian religious sym­
bols such as drums and colorful 
vestments as coisas do diabo (the 
devil’s things).
One of the first Catholics 
involved in this inter-religious 
effort was the late Combonian Fr. 
Hector Frissoti, who began his 
ministry by visiting the terreiros 
(sacred Afro-Brazilian places of 
worship). Frissoti published his 
reflections, sharing his experiences 
first with his own Comboni com­
munity and later with the larger 
Brazilian Catholic Church. The 
issue reached the agenda of the 
ninth annual meeting of Inter- 
Ecclesiastical Base Community 
Leaders in 1997, which brought
together 8000 participants, includ­
ing 67 bishops, in Sao Luiz, 
Maranhao. Supporters argued that 
inter-religious dialogue and celebra­
tions would be more inclusive of 
the many Catholics who also 
engage in Afro-Brazilian religious 
practices. However, Frissoti and 
others involved in the outreach 
effort met resistance on both sides. 
On the one hand, the bishops 
feared that such contact would tar­
nish the image of the Catholic 
Church. On the other, some prac­
titioners of Afro-Brazilian religions 
also opposed the discussion, largely 
because of their historic distrust of 
the church. As Ana Rita Santiago, 
a Candomble religious leader from 
Bahia, noted, “I am wary of a 
process that is limited to taking 
some of our symbols and simply 
incorporating them into the 
Catholic Mass.”
Despite these concerns, Frissoti’s 
spirit of reconciliation has had an 
impact in Brazil. In April 2000, 
during the commemorations of five 
hundred years of Portuguese colo­
nization in Brazil, the National 
Conference of Brazilian Bishops 
sought public forgiveness from 
indigenous and black peoples for 
not speaking out against injustices 
committed against them. For 
Nyaki, who has followed the 
emerging dialogue for the last six 
years, this is only the beginning. 
“Public statements from church 
leaders are a step,” she said, “but we 
also ask that Brazilian Catholics 
open their hearts and minds.” ■
Kathleen Bond, a Maryknoll lay mis­
sioned works with women and  
human rights issues in Jodo Pessoa, 
Paraiba, Brazil. For more informa­
tion about Mary knoll's overseas activ­
ities, contact Kathy Wright, MA1AF 
Admissions, P.O. Box 307,
Maryknoll, NY 10545-0307, 
www. maryknoll. org.
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The Mulatto Myth
Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes
A fro-Brazilian activists are struggling to change how blacks identify themselves.
In a culture that uses 
a range of racial designations to 
describe hair types and skin tones, 
they are urging Brazilians of 
African descent to embrace a pan­
black identity. Noting that blacks 
of all shades suffer similar obstacles 
in a white-dominated society, the 
campaigns attack the practice of 
auto-embranquecimento (self­
whitening), encouraging those who 
classify themselves as mulato, pardo 
or moreno to identify as negro 
instead.
These efforts challenge much of 
the conventional scholarship on 
race in Brazil. From the 1930s to 
the 1970s, in particular, Brazilian 
and foreign academics argued that 
Afro-Brazilians of different colors 
experienced markedly different 
socioeconomic realities. Lighter­
skinned blacks, they claimed, held 
a status intermediate between their 
disadvantaged darker-skinned com­
patriots (pretos) and more privi­
leged whites. This situation was 
said to contrast with the United 
States, where anyone with a trace 
of African heritage was assigned to 
the dispossessed “black” group.
Thus far, the campaign to chal­
lenge these notions has met with 
limited success. Despite occasional 
bursts of unity, significant color- 
based cleavages continue to hinder 
pan-black mobilization in Brazil. 
Some observers cite the earlier 
arguments and attribute the divi­
sions to socioeconomic gaps among 
blacks themselves. According to
this view, better-off pardos would 
have little to gain from political 
unity with pretos. Closer examina­
tion of the country’s history sug­
gests an alternative explanation: 
that the weakness of Afro-Brazilian 
unity derives in part from elite 
efforts to divide and dominate the 
black masses, exaggerating preto 
and pardo divisions to undermine 
the threat of pan-black union.
R a c i a l  D e m o c r a c y
Powerful Brazilians have long 
understood the benefits of disunity 
among blacks. Luis dos Santos 
Vilhena, a keen observer of late 
eighteenth-century Brazilian socie­
ty, argued that “if  African slaves are 
treacherous, creoles [Brazilian-born 
pretos] and mulatos are even more 
so ... if not for the rivalry between 
the former and the latter, all politi­
cal power and social order would 
crumble before a servile revolt.” 
Persistent fear of such a revolt and 
recognition of the usefulness (to 
elite dominance) of inter-black 
rivalries contributed to the devel­
opment of a “mulatto myth” as a 
key component of twentieth-centu­
ry Brazilian racial identity. 
According to this myth, because of 
their phenotypic and cultural 
approximation to whites, pardos 
hold themselves jealously above 
darker-skinned blacks and are able 
to secure for themselves a special 
place within Brazil’s racial hierar­
chy.
The mulatto myth has been 
repeated so often that it may now 
be impossible to determine its 
exact origins, although the writings 
of Gilberto Freyre, Arthur Ramos
and other Euro-Brazilian authors 
in the 1930s certainly lent the idea 
greater currency. A key moment in 
its acceptance was the first Afro- 
Brazilian Congress in 1934, the 
aim of which, according to Ramos, 
was to grant Brazilian blacks “the 
scientific and human vindication 
which could no longer be delayed.” 
Two central ideas dominated the 
proceedings: greater recognition 
(by whites) of positive black contri­
butions to Brazil, and modification 
of Brazilian attitudes toward black- 
white miscegenation.
Controversial as it was then, this 
“vindication” of blacks did not fun­
damentally challenge old attitudes 
about their proper “place” in socie­
ty. Instead, it can be interpreted as 
a skillful effort to foster national 
harmony by an elite forced to 
abandon slavery and the dream of 
building a “white” society in the 
Americas. Like their contempo­
raries in other Latin American 
countries, Brazilian intellectuals of 
the early twentieth century sought 
to redeem their nation’s image. 
They searched for an ideology that 
would boost confidence in their 
largely nonwhite population with­
out disturbing the balance of 
power. The ingenious result was 
“racial democracy”—the notion 
that, unlike other societies founded 
on race-based slavery, Brazil had 
almost magically escaped the grip 
of prejudice.
The mulatto myth was a critical 
component of this ideology.
Pardos—hitherto despised—sud­
denly became treasured symbols of 
national identity. Brazilian intel­
lectuals pointed to them as evi­
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Historical lessons for contemporary Afro-Brazilian 
identity
dence that, despite considerable 
differences, Europeans and Africans 
(and, less crucially by now, indige­
nous peoples) had blended to form 
a nation perfectly suited to a 
unique, tropical, European civiliza­
tion. This world view included no 
proposals to improve blacks’ social 
condition; instead, it was assumed 
that the liberal Luso-Brazilian atti­
tude toward race had already 
brought many improvements—at 
least for those blacks who were 
light-skinned and well-behaved 
enough. Because of racial amalga­
mation and pardo mobility, Freyre 
argued, “perhaps in no other coun­
try is it possible to rise so quickly 
from one social class to another.”
Mulatto women were an essential 
element of the myth. A corner­
stone of the ideology of racial 
democracy was their attractiveness 
to white males. Supposedly pos­
sessing stronger libidos and weaker 
racial prejudices than other 
European men, Luso-Brazilian 
males were said to idealize mulatas 
as sexual partners. Even today, 
popular books and movies rein­
force these images, as does the 
annual Carnaval jubilation, attract­
ing hordes of sex-seeking tourists 
from Europe and elsewhere. 
Miscegenation—preferably 
between white men and black 
women—thus became the pre­
scribed route to socioeconomic 
ascent, condemning Afro-Brazilians 
to a deceptively inclusive but 
fiercely patriarchal, sexist and racist 
doctrine.
Comparative scholars from 
abroad embraced the mulatto 
myth. Over decades, it was restat­
ed and reformulated by, among 
others, US sociologist Donald 
Pierson, Swedish anthropologist 
Magnus Morner, Dutch historian 
Harmannus Hoetink and US 
anthropologist Marvin Harris. In 
their writings, it became the critical 
factor for understanding differences 
in race relations between Brazil and 
the United States. Ironically, even 
scholars who attacked the notion 
of racial democracy supported the 
myth. In the 1970s, US historian 
Carl Degler published one of the 
most celebrated comparative works 
on Brazilian racial classification, in 
which he argued that “the presence 
of a separate place for the mulatto 
in Brazil and its absence in the 
United States define remarkably 
well the heart of the difference.” 
Degler maintained that Brazilian 
pardos were engaged in a “flight 
from blackness,” abandoning black 
causes and ascending the socioeco­
nomic hierarchy by bleaching their 
family lines through procreation 
with light-complexioned partners.
Little evidence was available to 
support these assertions. Many 
authors relied for proof on the very 
architects of racial democracy. For 
instance, in Negroes in Brazil— 
which many later writers cited as a 
classic—Pierson noted that his 
chapter on pardos was “greatly
indebted” to Freyre s Sabrados e 
Mucambas, one of the founding 
works on racial democracy.
T h e  H i s t o r ic a l  E v id e n c e
In reality, aside from a handful of 
exceptional cases, white Brazilians 
made few real distinctions between 
pardos and pretos during the 
nation’s early history. It is true that 
during the slave era pardos com­
prised a large portion of the free 
colored population, but freedom 
was often tenuous for blacks. In 
many cases, the law mandated sim­
ilar restrictions for all people of 
African descent—whether slave or 
free. Whatever their skin tone, free 
blacks were popularly referred to as 
escravos form s, or free slaves.
The vast majority of pardos lived 
humble lives. Judging from the 
repeated complaints of observers 
and officials, even those born to 
wealthy slaveholders were routinely 
abandoned by their white fathers. 
Left to fend for themselves in a 
harsh economic environment, 
many subsisted through risky, 
irregular and unrewarding toil or 
resorted to begging and theft. 
Perhaps because so many pardos 
were forced to live outside the law, 
slave-era reports regularly con­
demned them in harsher terms 
than pretos themselves. Pardos
The “mulatto myth” argued that Europeans, 
Africans and indigenous peoples had blend­
ed to form a nation perfectly suited to a 
unique, tropical, European civilization.
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were often denounced as immoral, 
lazy drunks who—unless 
enslaved—contributed nothing to 
society but a string of social ills. 
Alternatively, they were depicted in 
popular literature as presumptuous 
and vain, involved in ridiculous 
schemes to escape their cursed 
black blood.
In contrast to their mythical 
haughtiness, at least some pardos 
identified with pretos and dedicat­
ed themselves to black causes. Joao 
Fernandes Vieira and Vicente 
Ferreira de Paula are but two exam­
ples of pardos who led black rebel­
lions against white domination. 
Among the free pardos who played 
a prominent role in the struggle to 
end slavery was Luis Gama, who 
was sold into slavery by his white 
father. Eventually securing his 
freedom, Gama worked as a lawyer 
for escaped slaves, preaching the 
“right of insurrection.” Other par­
dos active in the anti-slavery strug­
gles included Jose do Patricfnio, 
who has been called “the heart and 
soul of the entire abolitionist cam­
paign,” and Andre Rebou9as, 
whose earnings as one of Brazil’s 
top engineers helped fund aboli­
tionist publications and societies.
The abolition of slavery in 1888 
proved a bitter disappointment, 
even for the Afro-Brazilians who 
had fought hardest to secure it. 
With the fall of the Brazilian 
monarchy the following year, the 
former slave-owners secured their 
hold on national policy making. 
They displayed little regard for for­
mer slaves, seeing them as inca­
pable of an unchained existence. 
From the 1890s through the 
1920s, certain prominent Brazilian 
intellectuals promoted “whitening” 
as the solution to the nation’s per­
ceived inferiority. They enthused 
that Brazil was becoming steadily 
whiter as the black population fell 
victim to its own social discord,
disease and low birth rates. 
Through miscegenation, they 
argued, blacks who reproduced 
with lighter-skinned partners 
allowed “stronger” white genes to 
dominate in their mixed-race off­
spring. In part to bolster the 
whitening effort, Brazil’s leaders 
actively recruited European immi­
grants. Until the nationalistic 
regime changes of the 1930s, white 
immigrants routinely enjoyed hir­
ing and pay advantages over blacks 
with comparable skills. Whatever 
tenuous positions some pardos had 
enjoyed as free workers during the 
slave era were sharply undermined 
during this period.
Some pardos continued to fight 
for black dignity after abolition. 
Manoel Querino (1851-1923) was 
the first Brazilian of any color to 
undertake a serious study of Afro- 
Brazilian history. He set out to 
prove that blacks were essential 
members of Brazilian society, not 
only as laborers, but also as defend­
ers and architects of national unity. 
Other middle-class pardos estab­
lished so-called “mulatto presses,” 
producing periodicals whose chief 
aim was to foster pan-black unity. 
Employing all-encompassing terms 
such as gen te de cor—people of 
color—they protested white dis­
crimination against blacks of all 
colors.
Ta c k l i n g  t h e  S t e r e o t y p e s
More scholars have begun to 
question the mulatto myth. As 
more studies are completed, it is 
increasingly obvious that Brazilians 
who classify themselves as pardo 
share much in economic terms 
with those who prefer the label 
preto. Studies by Brazilian and 
foreign researchers, including 
Nelson do Valle Silva, Carlos 
Hasenbalg, George Reid Andrews 
and Peggy Webster, suggest that, if 
anything, pardos enjoy only mini­
mal advantages over pretos. As a 
group, blacks are considerably 
worse off than whites.
In light of these findings, many 
researchers have chosen to examine 
Brazilian racial conditions along 
white versus nonwhite lines.
Major Brazilian institutes, includ­
ing the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estadi'sticas (equivalent 
to the US Census Bureau), have 
also opted for bimodal classifica­
tions when dealing with socioeco­
nomic data on race. This trend 
supports the efforts of many Afro- 
Brazilian activist groups, such as 
the Movimento Negro Unificado, 
to redefine as negro “all those who 
possess in the color of their skins, 
in their faces or in their hair, fea­
tures characteristic of that race.”
But the task of transforming 
racial identity in Brazil will take 
more than the statistical union of 
pardos and pretos in textbooks and 
government records. An important 
first step is the deconstruction of 
the myths that scholars have 
helped create. Many academics in 
the past perceived racial classifica­
tions as the politically neutral 
products of cultural, demographic 
or historical circumstances. Afro- 
Brazilian activists, by contrast, are 
painfully aware that these defini­
tions can be manipulated by the 
powerful to reinforce their posi­
tions of dominance. Equally 
important is the realization that 
racial identities can be embraced 
by the subjugated to strengthen 
their political positions. ■
Andrew J. de Groot Fernandes is a 
Ph.D. candidate in the Flistory 
Department a t Tulane University.
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Coloring the Nation
by D avid  Howard
Dominicans describe race with color-coded 
terms ranging from coffee, chocolate, cin­
namon and wheat to indio, nomenclature 
which avoids using mulato or negro.
T he Dominican Republic holds an important position in today’s Caribbean. Increasingly linked to the United States via the transna­
tional flow of people, capital and 
culture, Dominican society faces 
many challenges: adaptation to the 
changing demands of external cul­
tural, economic and political rela­
tions, and recognition of the inter­
nal tensions produced by a conflic- 
tive civil history and contested 
social identities.
Dominican nationalism has often 
been colored by a pervasive racism, 
centered on a rejection of African 
ancestry and negritud. European 
and indigenous heritages in the 
Dominican Republic have been cel­
ebrated at the expense of an African 
past. In particular, the notion of 
dom inicanidad has been constructed 
vis-a-vis Haiti, which shares the 
island of Hispaniola with its 
Dominican neighbor. A racially 
constructed fault-line has arisen 
from this territorial and historical 
association.
The history and physical location 
of the Dominican Republic heavily 
influence its citizens’ perception of 
race. Three groups formed the 
demographic basis for colonial soci­
ety in the Dominican Republic: the 
indigenous population, Spanish set­
tlers and African slaves. By the 
middle of the sixteenth century 
only a minute fraction of the 
indigenous population remained, 
but the notion of lo indio has 
become an integral part of contem­
porary Dominican identity.
History has been renegotiated,
resignified and reinvented to create 
a sense of the past appropriate to 
the social and political present.
The majority of Dominicans 
could be described as mulato, but a 
variety of racial identities exist with­
in this broad category. As S. Torres- 
Saillant has argued, African 
Dominicans do not see blackness as 
central to their racial awareness; 
other racial terms are employed 
instead to describe racial identity. 
Indio is by far the most common 
and adaptable. Flexible descriptions 
of color and phenotype allow famil­
ial and social variations of race to 
be incorporated in a society where a 
light racial aesthetic is paramount. 
Despite the malleable nature of 
racial definition, however, everyday 
instances of prejudice and discrimi­
nation are evident and often overt.
R a c e , R a c i s m  a n d  I d e n t it y
The term mulato itself demon­
strates the subjectivity of race in the 
Dominican Republic. Whereas 
outsiders may view most 
Dominicans as mulato, Dominicans 
themselves seldom use the term, for 
it implies the negatively perceived 
image of African ancestry.
Historically, Dominican elites 
have emphasized their strong 
European heritage and ‘purity of 
blood.’ They celebrated Spain, the
former colonial power, as la Madre 
Patria, and cited Europe as the 
source of Dominican culture and 
civility. In the twentieth century, 
this European bias was replaced in 
many respects by a dependency on 
the United States. To this day, a 
light aesthetic remains fundamental 
to any consideration of contempo­
rary social relations.
Given the ambiguities involved in 
the definition and ascription of 
race, strict racial categories become 
meaningless, confusing or blatantly 
inaccurate, depending on the view­
point of the observer or statistician. 
The 1940 Dominican census 
counted mulatos as 77% of the 
population; negros, 1 2 %; and blan- 
cos, 11%. In 1960, census takers 
were instructed to avoid registering 
Dominicans as negro where feasi­
ble. Less than a tenth of the popu­
lation was classified as black.
More recently, researchers have cal­
culated the Dominican population 
as 65% mulato, 15% bianco and 
15% negro, with the remaining 5 % 
of the population belonging to 
other ethnic groups, such as 
Chinese or Lebanese.
These figures are fairly meaning­
less. The continuum of skin color 
and phenotype does not fall into 
neat categories; what one person 
considers mulato will be negro to
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Acutely aware of his own nonelite ethnic and 
social origins, Trujillo chose to deny his 
country’s Haitian and African ancestry, even 
resorting to lightening his own skin with 
cosmetic powders.
another. Racial terms are highly 
specific to person and place. 
Dominicans describe race with 
color-coded terms ranging from cof­
fee, chocolate, cinnamon and wheat 
to indio, nomenclature which 
avoids using mulato or negro.
Indio is an ambiguous term, not 
least because the entire indigenous 
population of Hispaniola died or 
was killed within 50 years of 
Columbus’s arrival. Historically, 
the term has been used to describe 
brown skin color. It was not until 
the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas 
Trujillo (1930 to 1961) that it was 
popularized as an official descrip­
tion of Dominican ethnicity. The 
use of indio is another instance of 
denial of African ancestry and rejec­
tion of Haiti. It creates a racial cat­
egory that cannot claim to be 
white, but distances itself from 
blackness.
Acutely aware of his own nonelite 
ethnic and social origins, Trujillo 
chose to deny his country’s Haitian 
and African ancestry, even resorting 
to lightening his own skin with cos­
metic powders. Trujillo’s grandpar­
ents were dark-skinned, but com­
missioned biographies declared his 
parentage to be ‘pure’ European and 
traced his bloodlines to a Spanish 
officer and a French marquis. The 
massacre of 1937, during which the 
Dominican military murdered over
12,000 dark-skinned Haitians and 
Dominicans, was part of Trujillo’s 
‘lightening’ project to distance the 
Dominican nation from its Haitian
neighbor and African heritage.
The bias toward lighter skin color 
in the Dominican Republic is often 
expressed in terms of aesthetics. 
Racial descriptions frequently focus 
on perceptions of ugliness and 
beauty. Job advertisements that call 
for employees of ‘good appearance,’ 
for example, may use a coded term 
for race. Color prejudice is often 
seen in Dominican banks, as well. 
Until recently it was rare for the 
public spaces of major banks to be 
staffed by dark-skinned cashiers.
The aesthetics of racism were also 
evident in a study of university stu­
dents who were asked if they would 
marry a darker-skinned partner. 
Fifty-five percent replied that they 
would not, expressing concern for 
the ‘corruption’ of physical appear­
ance through ‘race mixing.’
A range of terms used in everyday 
speech avoid the implication of 
African ancestry. Trigueno, rosadito, 
destehido, rubio and cenizo respec­
tively refer to skin color as wheat- 
colored, rosy, faded, blond/fair and 
dark/ashen. These terms are regu­
larly applied to the slightest varia­
tion of color and tend to be wholly 
inconsistent and variable in their 
usage. The latter two, rubio and 
cenizo, are located at opposite ends 
of the color spectrum, but differen­
tiation may be slight according to 
the context of their usage.
H a it ia n s  a n d  D o m in ic a n s
In contrast to this great variation 
of color terminology, the attitude
toward Haitians, and especially 
their presence in the Dominican 
Republic, is often bluntly discrimi­
natory. The number of Haitians 
living in the Dominican Republic is 
a highly contentious issue.
Estimates vary widely; some suggest 
up to 1 .5  million, but there are 
probably around 500,000 Haitians 
and Dominicans of recent Haitian 
descent in Dominican territory.
The size of this population is said 
to have doubled in the past 1 0  to 
15 years. Particularly since the 
1920s, Haitians have migrated to 
work in the Dominican sugar 
industry and have established rural 
communities, often under condi­
tions that have provoked concern 
among international human rights 
organizations. Many Haitians now 
work in urban areas as retailers and 
domestic workers or in the con­
struction industry.
Significant numbers of Haitians 
stay on in the Dominican Republic 
after their seasonal contracts expire. 
Their continuing residence in the 
country, the indeterminate nation­
ality of their offspring (who have 
neither Dominican nor Haitian citi­
zenship) and the scale of undocu­
mented Haitian immigration are 
emotive issues. Despite a history of 
annual labor contracts between the 
two countries, the Dominican mili­
tary regularly deports Haitian work­
ers, often without regard for their 
legal status. Proposed changes to 
the current migration law may 
remove the longstanding right to 
citizenship for those born in 
Dominican territory, further mar­
ginalizing the Haitian-Dominican 
population. Even those who can 
claim Dominican citizenship face 
strict documentation requirements 
or the threat of harassment.
Dominicans have traditionally 
scorned work in the cane fields, 
which is seen almost exclusively as 
Haitian labor. The rural Haitian
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population is segregated physically 
as a racial labor enclave, and socially 
by racism and popular opposition 
to assimilation. Dominicans recog­
nize their need for Haitians as units 
of labor, but condemn them to con­
ditions of marginalization and infe­
riority.
Is prejudice against Haiti func­
tional to the Dominican state? 
Haitian migrants provide low-cost, 
essentially malleable labor. It could 
be argued that wages are depressed 
and conditions worsened for 
Dominican workers, who then vili­
fy the darker-skinned Haitian labor­
ers. Even restrictions on immigra­
tion and residency, imposed by the 
Dominican government, deliberate­
ly place Haitian labor in a vulnera­
ble, servile position of illegality in 
the context of widespread racial 
prejudice.
Anti-Haitian sentiment extends 
well beyond the workplace to com­
mon derogatory slurs on the street 
and in presidential campaign rheto­
ric. Dominican electioneering dur­
ing the 1990s was a hotbed of racist 
politics. In the 1994 elections, 
defamatory campaigns against dark- 
skinned presidential candidate Jose 
Francisco Pena Gomez concentrated 
on his suspected Haitian parentage. 
Videos broadcast on Dominican 
television portrayed the late Pena 
Gomez as hot-headed and irra­
tional, shouting and arguing at 
political meetings—connoting neg­
ative stereotypes of Haitians as sav­
age and uncivilized. The media 
linked him closely with vodoun , and 
one video showed him attending a 
ceremony with a Brazilian faith 
healer. Political opponents faxed 
cartoons depicting the supposed 
threat of Pena Gomez’s Haitian 
ancestry to the Dominican people 
to all numbers in Santo Domingo.
The potency of racism lies in its 
embeddedness as a perceived natu­
ral phenomenon. Dominicans
often excuse their anti-Haitian sen­
timent as harmless, or refer to it as 
‘common sense’ traditional rivalry. 
Yet, although Haitians bear the 
brunt of Dominican aggression, 
dark-skinned Dominicans suffer 
similar racist insults or are treated as 
lower-status citizens, somatically 
sidelined from authentic dom ini- 
canidad.
Racist ideology portrays Haitians 
and dark-skinned Dominicans as 
victims of their own racial fate; 
both are trapped by the color of 
their skin and their genetic history. 
Sympathy for the victim is muted 
by the racist argument that Haitians 
induce antipathy towards them­
selves via allegedly innate cultural 
practices, such as vodoun, which 
are incompatible with Dominican 
society. The concept of la raza 
dominicana unites Dominicans 
against Haitians, but when per­
ceived in terms of race, the same 
idea relegates dark-skinned 
Dominicans to the margins of an 
imaginary racial heartland. La raza 
inclusively combines race and 
nation, and the prejudices of overt 
and inferential racism.
M ig r a t in g  I d e n t it ie s  a n d  R a c e
The Dominican Republic has 
changed dramatically during the 
last four decades, when the end of 
the trujillato opened the island to 
external cultural and economic 
influences. The reality or hope of 
international migration has become 
part of many Dominicans’ lives.
The vast reach of international rela­
tions, through migration, telecom­
munications, travel, business links, 
mass media and the arts, provides 
an intense and frequent interchange 
of economic and cultural experi­
ences. Dominican migrants share 
family, friends and business contacts 
between two or more countries, 
while maintaining strong social and 
cultural links with their country of
origin. The perception and aware­
ness of race, however, are among 
the few aspects yet to be trans­
formed by transnational develop­
ments.
Dominicans living in the US face 
different challenges of racial and 
ethnic determination. Those born 
outside the island relate less to 
racialized concepts of domini- 
canidad as they grow up in a society 
that promotes more abrupt notions 
of black, white or Hispanic. Even 
the well-worn antagonism toward 
Haiti confronts problems of legiti­
macy on the streets of upper 
Manhattan. Several writers have 
suggested that the discrimination 
experienced by Dominicans in New 
York has the potential to change 
perceptions of race in the 
Dominican Republic. Yet, the very 
success of the Dominican regenera­
tive experience has to some extent 
reproduced racial norms rather than 
dispelled them. Dominicans born 
in the United States, although less 
attached to the traditional, highly 
racialized concept of dominicanidad, 
continue to use terms such as indio, 
trigueno or rubio. In the 1990 cen­
sus, only 26% of New York’s 
Dominicans classified themselves as 
black. Most listed themselves as 
white or ‘other.’ US society at large 
was not made privy to the ‘other’ 
category of indio.
Dominicans both in and outside 
of the Dominican Republic are hav­
ing to constantly readdress their 
attitudes toward race. The chal­
lenge of this adjustment will take 
time to unfold. Meanwhile, the 
impact of migratory experience on 
la raza dominicana remains uncer­
tain. ■
David Howard is a lecturer in the 
Department o f  Geography at the 
University o f  Edinburgh.
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Ethnicity and Nationhood
by Ileana Schmidt-Diaz de Leon
Since the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican government has encouraged an educational policy designed to assimilate 
Indians into national life. 
Assimilation has implied the loss of 
Indian identity as a condition of the 
process of forging Mexican national 
identity. For the last 20 years, how­
ever, the Mexican educational sys­
tem has offered specialized teaching 
materials in Indian languages. These 
materials include free textbooks cre­
ated especially for Indian children by 
Indian teachers, emphasizing indige­
nous cultural values. The textbooks 
are a new tool for Indian teachers to 
promote ethnic identity within for­
mal institutions, contributing an 
added dimension to the struggle of 
indigenous peoples to defend and 
redefine their identity within the 
Mexican national context. They 
have empowered Indian teachers 
and promoted the use of Indian lan­
guages, changing the techniques 
used for Indian education.
This study is based on an analyti­
cal description of first- and second- 
grade textbooks in the Nahuatl lan­
guage, used in the Huasteca region 
of Mexico (which includes portions 
of the states of Veracruz,
Tamaulipas, San Luis Potosf,
Hidalgo and Queretaro) and the 
northern highlands of Puebla. It 
analyzes the discourse of texts and 
images to identify elements that pro­
mote ethnic and national identity 
among Indian children. As an insti­
tutional program, indigenous free 
textbooks are an element of national 
educational policy. The participa­
tion of indigenous teachers in their
Page from  the 1549Mendoza Codex showing the different tasks taught to children by 
gender. Boys are taught to carry loads, row and fish, while girls cook, weave and 
sweep. In the upper panels, children are disciplined with such punishments as breath­
ing the fum es o f  burning chiles. The indigenous fr ee  textbooks reinforce gender roles 
along with other traditional values.
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Mexico’s indigenous free textbooks
creation suggests that Indians in 
Mexico are not simply engaged in a 
process of acculturation. Using state 
institutions to redefine ethnic identi­
ty, Indians participate in the mestizo 
world not only to be changed, but 
also to continue being themselves.
M e x ic o ’s  F r e e  T e x t b o o k s
At the heart of the curriculum in 
Mexican schools are government- 
issued textbooks, the use of which is 
mandatory in all of the country’s 
classrooms. Free textbooks have 
been an element of state educational 
policy since a special commission to 
organize their production was creat­
ed in 1959. The books’ content 
reflected a new emphasis on national 
unity, in contrast to the revolution’s 
emphasis on class struggle. In the 
context of education, national unity 
meant cultural homogeneity as the 
ultimate expression of mexicanidad. 
Mexico could only become a nation 
when every Mexican was united by a 
set of common values and feelings. 
The national free textbooks have 
been reviewed and changed several 
times. The most recent revision was 
in 1992, when the curriculum was 
reformed and special textbooks 
introduced for regional history and 
geography. Each state now has its 
own history and geography text­
books in addition to the national 
surveys of these topics.
Mexico’s Indian communities have 
always represented a challenge to 
national educators. Modern educa­
tional materials for teaching Indian 
children to read and write trace back 
at least to 1936, when cartillas de 
alfabetizacion (literacy primers) 
sought to teach Indian children
Spanish by first making them liter­
ate in their own languages. In 1979, 
the First National Seminar of 
Bilingual-Bicultural Education in 
Oaxtepec, Morelos produced the 
idea of providing free textbooks to 
Indian children. The seminar was 
organized by the Alianza Nacional 
de Profesionales Indfgenas Bilingiies 
A.C. (ANPIBAC), members of 
which went on to work at the newly 
formed Direccion General de 
Educacion Indfgena (DGEI) at the 
Ministry of Public Education. The 
DGEI was incorporated as a formal 
branch of the ministry, replacing the 
former Direccion General de 
Educacion Extraescolar en el Medio 
Indfgena. In contrast to its prede­
cessor, the DGEI was not relegated 
to extracurricular or “special” educa­
tion; instead, Indian education was 
legally recognized as an integral part 
of the Mexican educational system.
Through the DGEI and the 
Ministry of Public Education, the 
Indian teachers of ANPIBAC nego­
tiated and defined the goals, means 
and orientation of formal Indian 
education. The ministry issued the 
first free textbooks for Indian chil­
dren in 1980, and to date it has pro­
duced editions in 56 different 
indigenous languages. These text­
books are part of a national program 
and their general content is directed 
by a common national objective; 
however, they are not mere “transla­
tions” or “copies” of the national 
Spanish-language textbooks. In gen­
eral, the indigenous free textbooks 
focus on content related to Indian 
cultures, whereas the national text­
books focus on mestizo national 
ideals.
In d ig e n o u s  F r e e  T e x t b o o k s  a n d  
E t h n ic  Id e n t it y
Mexico’s indigenous free textbooks 
are saturated with cultural values. 
They express the way of life, beliefs 
and customs of Mexico’s indigenous 
groups. Many of these values are 
expressed in the way men, women 
and children are depicted conduct­
ing their daily life and work. 
Through these activities, indigenous 
people preserve and redefine their 
ethnic identity in terms of their rela­
tionships within the community and 
with the national society. Each gen­
der and age group is shown per­
forming specific tasks appropriate to 
Indian cultural values.
In the Indian free textbooks, these 
values include family, community, 
collective work, land, corn and 
knowledge. The extended family is 
the preferred kinship structure, and 
membership in it is emblematic of 
belonging to the wider social group. 
Individual life is subjected to social 
life and family maintenance; the fail­
ure of an individual to carry out his 
or her responsibilities affects the 
entire family nucleus.
In the books, the family and the 
home are strongly linked. The man 
is the provider and the woman is the 
housekeeper. Among children, too, 
many activities are distributed by 
gender, typically according to the 
physical space in which the children 
carry them out. Usually, boys per­
form their tasks outside the home, 
while girls perform them inside, 
although the activities may in fact be 
the same. The family’s equilibrium 
appears to reside in the relationship 
between it and the home. The indi­
vidual, the family and the home are
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integrated elements of nature, and 
nature is an integrated element of 
life. Each family member has a 
responsibility to fulfill in order to 
maintain this equilibrium.
The Nahuatl textbooks present 
the family as a patriarchal structure 
in which the man has clearly defined 
social functions. Women’s functions 
are sometimes ambiguous; at times 
women are portrayed as advisors to 
their children, but this capacity is 
often obscured by the grandfather’s 
role as the main transmitter of cul­
tural values. He ensures that family 
members carry out their responsibil­
ities and maintain the people’s cus­
toms. The grandfather is responsi­
ble for transmitting tradition and 
history, whereas the mother teaches 
children how to behave and perform 
certain tasks. The mother advises 
only her own children, while the 
grandfather teaches all children in 
the community.
Thus, the grandfather guides the 
performance of tradition, the moth­
er runs the household and the father 
provides food. Women give life, 
and men work to maintain and pre­
serve it in a certain way. These roles 
are presented in the context of an 
overall image of the Indian as a 
poor, hard-working peasant, a pro­
ducer and consumer of maize who 
from childhood on is responsible for 
the family’s sustenance.
The poor Indian is a constant in 
the textbooks, in which the routine 
of daily activities is presented as nec­
essary for survival. In this context, 
any change in women’s roles could 
jeopardize the family and the larger 
community. The main value the 
textbooks teach is that the family is 
the nucleus of community and the 
central element in defining ethnicity. 
Questioning this order implies a 
threat to the organization of survival 
and Indian identity itself.
The family may be the center of 
survival, but it cannot exist outside
the community. The two are linked 
through specific ways of life, lan­
guage, land and commerce. The 
family’s relationship to the commu­
nity is like the individual’s relation­
ship to the family; neither can be 
conceived of as separate from the 
other. Ethnic identity is transmitted 
to the community through rites, cer­
emonies and the fulfillment of cul­
tural values supported by the family.
Land links families and is an ele­
ment of spatial and cultural belong­
ing. Images in the textbooks of men 
sowing the land in the traditional 
manner imply possession of the 
knowledge needed to cultivate and 
harvest food, including mastering 
the agricultural calendar, tools, ritu­
als and the organization of labor. 
Corn itself is the staple source of 
nourishment for Indian peoples, and 
is linked to identity through its pro­
duction and transformation as food. 
In the Nahuatl textbooks, corn pro­
duction is associated with male 
labor, whereas corn transformation is 
associated with female work. Maize 
is presented as the legacy of the 
ancestors and Centeotl, the god of 
corn. It is an element of tradition 
and the life cycle, providing suste­
nance and the reason to work. 
Moreover, working the family’s 
milpa, or corn plot, requires the par­
ticipation of several people. Corn 
thus brings individuals together in 
the collective responsibility to work 
for the survival of family and com­
munity.
Work helps define relationships 
among family members and between 
them and the community. Women 
relate to the family primarily 
through food processing and prepa­
ration, while men relate to the com­
munity through collective work and 
rituals. In turn, all community 
members are linked to each other 
through a common history originat­
ing in Aztec times. The textbooks 
express these values as traditional
knowledge that is both a product of 
experience and a legacy passed on 
from generation to generation.
The textbooks present two kinds 
of knowledge: traditional knowledge 
and school knowledge. The elders 
are the source of the former and 
teachers of the latter. Teachers are 
portrayed as organizers and guides, 
with the peculiarity of being able to 
fail at the performance of tradition. 
Older men are presented as sages 
because they have traditional knowl­
edge and speak the native language. 
Reading and writing are related only 
to school; these are the school­
teacher’s tasks and knowledge.
When the school is involved in 
the relation between the individual 
and the community, gender- and 
age-based activities are modified by 
values ascribed only to the school. 
This is the only place where women 
are shown performing nontradition- 
al activities, characterized as being 
performed outside the home, that 
include teaching children to read 
and write. The school is a kind of 
neutral ground where boys and girls 
acquire the universal student ethos.
School plays a dual role in cultural 
change and continuity. On the one 
hand, it gives Indian children oppor­
tunities that their parents did not 
have before. On the other hand, it 
teaches Indian language, history, cul­
tural values and traditions. School 
also plays a role in adult gender 
dynamics, representing a space 
where men and women can change 
their relationship with the commu­
nity and their social role within it.
A woman may make tortillas at 
home, but she can also teach the 
alphabet at school.
T h e  I n d ig e n o u s  F r ee  T e x t b o o k  
a n d  N a t io n a l  I d e n t it y
The Mexican free textbook is an 
agent of socialization. Its contents 
are intended to become part of a 
student’s values and beliefs. Topics
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included in the textbooks are set by 
the Ministry of Public Education 
and involve not only educational 
goals, but also the orientation of 
national educational policy. Because 
the main interest of Mexican educa­
tional policy is the promotion of 
nationality via the education of all 
citizens, learning the values included 
in the free textbooks is necessary for 
maintaining the national society.
The indigenous free textbooks, 
therefore, are official educational 
tools for promoting both nationality 
and Indianness.
The Nahuatl free textbooks pres­
ent three levels of identity: Indian, 
Nahuatl and Mexican. Being Indian 
means being poor, rural, a producer 
and consumer of corn, technologi­
cally unsophisticated, a hard worker 
responsible for the family’s survival, 
a preserver of ethnic identity, and a 
possessor of values that should be 
preserved. Nahuatl identity is con­
veyed primarily through language, 
community and regional origin. 
National identity is represented by 
national symbols and the Mexican 
Constitution.
One way in which national identi­
ty is related to Nahuatl identity is 
through Mexico’s national symbols, 
many of which originate in the 
Aztec past. The symbols represent 
the history of the Nahuatl people 
transformed into national mytholo­
gy. For example, the Mexican flag, 
which shows an eagle standing on a 
cactus and devouring a serpent, bor­
rows an image from Aztec history. 
Citizenship is therefore not an 
assigned condition, but belongs to 
the Nahuatl people for historic rea­
sons. The sense one gets from the 
textbooks is that being Mexican does 
not mean living according to the 
values of the national society; rather, 
it is a state acquired naturally by 
virtue of history.
From a Nahuatl point of view, 
therefore, Mexican national symbols
are not necessarily associated with 
schools or other state institutions. 
Schools in the Nahuatl textbooks are 
associated more with the process of 
learning to read and write than with 
a sense of nationhood. Although 
the official role of the Indian schools 
is to promote national identity, in 
practice they serve as a formal means 
of ethnic redefinition. The indige­
nous free textbooks do not deny 
national identity; rather, they pro­
mote respect for law and portray the 
state as an abstract authority from 
which Indians receive protection.
The books give a sense of Indians 
attempting not only to be tolerated 
by non-Indians, but also to have 
their differences recognized and 
accepted.
B e l o n g in g  a n d  D iff e r e n c e
Can Indians be part of the nation 
while maintaining their unique cul­
tures and ethnic identities? The 
experience of the indigenous free 
textbooks suggests that Indians can 
work within the state’s institutions 
to influence indigenista policy-mak­
ing; that is, they can live according 
to the rules of the mestizo while 
protecting Indian culture. Indian 
teachers have accomplished this 
duality by using institutionalized 
educational material that promotes 
Indian identity and culture in 
Indian languages.
The existence of free textbooks for 
Indian children in their own lan­
guages has a special meaning. It 
implies conscious action by Indian 
teachers and communities to direct 
the formal education of Indian 
youth. Indian teachers have gained 
an arena in formal education to pro­
mote their cultural objectives. Their 
role is protected by the acceptance 
of Indian languages as legitimate 
routes of learning. The textbooks 
are an example of Indian participa­
tion in institutions that directly 
pressure Indian cultures.
The presence of individuals with a 
recognized ethnic identity in nation­
al institutions does not necessarily 
mean a loss of identity; rather, it can 
be a strategy to achieve protection 
and benefits from the state. Indians 
in Mexico are struggling within the 
boundaries of the state to influence 
political decisions that affect their 
sense of identity. The indigenous 
free textbooks offer a world view in 
which the principal desire is to con­
tinue being Indian. The books 
teach children to preserve a way of 
life without questioning the status 
quo of either Indian or national 
society; even rural poverty is justified 
as a condition for preserving Indian 
culture. Nevertheless, the books 
themselves have made Indians par­
ticipants in the national educational 
program. Indian teachers have 
defined the content of the textbooks 
based on their own cultural values, 
making the books a forum for 
Indians to manifest their inclusion 
within the Mexican nation.
The indigenous free textbooks also 
empower Indians to be literate in 
their own languages. Indians now 
have not only a written language, 
but also the means to learn it in an 
institutionalized framework. This 
situation benefits Indians as well as 
the state: The former gain a politi­
cal forum from which they cannot 
be excluded, and the latter is legit­
imized by including Indians in its 
development programs.
Indians want to be recognized and 
respected for their cultural differ­
ences while participating actively in 
the modern state. In other words, 
they seek recognition as members of 
the nation and actors in the national 
program. After all, Mexico was 
founded on the land of their ances­
tors. ■
Ileana Schmidt-Dlaz de Leon is a doc­
toral candidate in the Latin American 
Studies program at Tulane University.
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Our Land
Coat o f  arms o f  Nunavut. The caribou and narwahl represent the land and sea 
animals that are pa rt o f  Nunavut’s rich natural heritage and provide sustenance 
to its people. The motto in Inuktitut reads, Nunavut, our strength.
by Andre Legare
n April 1, 1999, the 
Canadian govern­
ment officially pro­
claimed the Nunavut 
Territory and govern­
ment. Nunavut, an Inuktitut word 
which means “our land,” was carved 
out of the Northwest Territories to 
become the most recent member of 
the Canadian federation. It is also 
Canadas largest political unit, cover­
ing one-fifth of the country’s land 
mass (2.1 million square km). This 
vast geographic area is inhabited by 
only 25,000 people, more than 80% 
of whom are Inuit.
The Nunavut territorial govern­
ment enjoys the same political pow­
ers as other territorial governments 
in Canada. These powers and juris­
dictions are similar to those held by 
Canadian provinces, except that the 
Canadian federal government owns 
and manages public crown lands in 
Nunavut, the Yukon and North­
west Territories. Like the other terri­
tories, Nunavut is a non-ethnic pub­
lic jurisdiction; however, since Inuit 
comprise the majority population, 
Nunavut has become a de facto 
Inuit government.
B a c k g r o u n d
The idea of creating a new politi­
cal jurisdiction in Canada’s north 
stemmed from a proposal submitted 
by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (a pan- 
Canadian Inuit organization) to the 
federal government in February 
1976. The Nunavut Proposal was 
put forth as part of federal policy on 
native comprehensive land claims. 
The basic idea of the proposal was 
to create a territory with a majority 
Inuit population to better reflect
Inuit values and perspectives than 
was the case in the Northwest 
Territories.
After 15 years of arduous negotia­
tions between the Canadian govern­
ment, the Northwest Territories and 
Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (an 
umbrella group of organizations rep­
resenting the interests of the Inuit of
the central and eastern Canadian 
Arctic), a final land claims agree­
ment was approved by the federal 
government in June 1993. This 
agreement recognized the need to 
establish a new territorial govern­
ment in the central and eastern 
Canadian Arctic, a goal realized in
1999.
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The challenges o f  an Inuit government in Nunavut
Economic reliance on the federal govern­
ment, low education rates and linguistic 
assimilation are among the challenges facing 
the Nunavut Territory.
For the Canadian government, the 
reasons for establishing the new ter­
ritory were largely political. The 
measure attracted favorable media 
coverage and represented an oppor­
tunity to improve Canada’s standing 
in the international community. It 
was also an effective means of rein­
forcing Canadian sovereignty over 
the waters of the Arctic archipelago, 
an issue the United States has been 
reluctant to recognize.
The Nunavut Territory gives the 
Inuit control over 353,610 square 
km, with mineral rights in a 36,257 
square km area. Co-management 
agencies, equally composed of Inuit 
and federal government representa­
tives, manage land resources.
Federal funds in the amount of 1.15 
billion Canadian dollars will be dis­
bursed in Nunavut over a 14-year 
period, and the Inuit are entitled to 
a percentage of royalties from 
resource development projects.
P o l it ic a l  Q u e st io n s
Despite these gains, however, 
political administration of the 
Nunavut Territory faces important 
challenges. Six areas seem likely to 
have an impact on Nunavut’s politi­
cal future: (1) Inuit employment 
and the Nunavut public sector; (2) 
language policy; (3) the territory’s 
finances; (4) traditional knowledge 
and Nunavut government policies; 
(5 ) coexistence between co-manage- 
ment agencies and government insti­
tutions; and (6 ) the inherent Inuit 
right to self-government.
Among the most pressing of these 
problems is Inuit representation in 
public sector employment. For 
Nunavut residents, the vast majority
of whom are Inuit, to evolve a posi­
tive feeling of identity with Nunavut 
political institutions, it would be 
important for Inuit not only to con­
trol the legislative assembly (15 of 
the 19 members are Inuit), but also 
public sector administration. To 
reach this crucial goal it is imperative 
to have a representative proportion 
of Inuit civil servants (i.e., approxi­
mately 80% of public employees) in 
the territorial government.
The Nunavut Implementation 
Commission has predicted that the 
territory’s public sector will employ 
1200 people by January 1, 2002. 
Before Nunavut was established, 550 
civil servants in the Northwest 
Territories administration lived in 
the Nunavut region. About half of 
these employees (300) were Inuit. 
They generally filled subordinate 
positions, and all were transferred to 
the new Nunavut government.
With only 300 Inuit currently in the 
Nunavut public sector, is it realistic 
to believe that the goal of 1000 Inuit 
civil servants will be met in the next 
two years? This question is even 
more acute when one considers that 
less than 200 Inuit in Nunavut have 
completed a high school education 
and only 1 0  have a university degree 
(one of them is the Premier of 
Nunavut, Paul Okalik). In view of 
the lack of training of Inuit job can­
didates, those who are hired will 
most likely continue to occupy sub­
ordinate positions within Nunavut’s 
administration.
A second essential challenge facing 
the new territory is language policy. 
Today, about 85% of the Inuit pop­
ulation in Nunavut speaks Inuktitut. 
However, the risk of linguistic assim­
ilation in favor of the English lan­
guage remains high, particularly 
among the younger Inuit generation. 
Already, close to half of Inuit under 
the age of 15 cannot speak Inuktitut. 
In its role as protector of Inuit cul­
ture and language, the territorial 
government must enact a language 
policy aimed at safeguarding and 
promoting the Inuit language in 
Nunavut.
A third concern facing Nunavut’s 
political leaders is financial. 
Nunavut’s weak tax base, the fact 
that its natural resources are mostly 
owned by the federal government, 
and the territory’s remoteness from 
southern markets make it almost 
entirely dependent on federal funds. 
The annual budget of the Nunavut 
government was fixed at 640 million 
Canadian dollars, (fiscal year 
2 0 0 0 /2 0 0 1 ), of which $580 million 
will be provided by Ottawa. This 
economic reliance on the federal 
government may limit Nunavut’s 
political autonomy.
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Fourth, Nunavut’s government 
faces the challenge of incorporating 
Inuit traditional knowledge into the 
territory’s administration. The Inuit 
people have roots firmly anchored in 
the Arctic landscape and a world 
view that encompasses particular 
relationships with the natural and 
spirit worlds. Most Inuit, and in 
particular the community’s elders, 
believe that government laws, insti­
tutions and programs should reflect 
Inuit traditional knowledge. They 
want to see Nunavut government 
policies incorporate some Inuit val­
ues and customs into the decision­
making process. Among Nunavut’s
1 0  government ministries, however, 
the Department of Culture, Elders 
and Youth, which is responsible for 
the implementation of a traditional 
knowledge policy, was allocated the 
lowest annual budget ($4 million). 
Under these circumstances, can 
Nunavut’s legislators be expected to 
formulate and enact an Inuit tradi­
tional knowledge policy?
The implementation of the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
created five co-management agen­
cies, leading to another area of con­
flict in Nunavut. The co-manage­
ment agencies, equally composed of 
native and non-native representa­
tives, have a mandate to protect the 
environment and manage the devel­
opment of natural resources within 
the Nunavut settlement area. These 
responsibilities overlap with those of 
the Nunavut Department of 
Sustainable Development. To avoid 
potential conflict, it will be impor­
tant to implement close cooperation 
between the co-management agen­
cies and this government depart­
ment.
Finally, unresolved issues remain 
with regard to the Inuit right to self-
Hemisphere Volume 9, Number 3
Features: Nunavut
government. For Ottawa, the estab­
lishment of the Nunavut Territory 
answers the traditional demands of 
Inuit leaders. The federal govern­
ment argues that the Inuit of 
Nunavut, through their majority 
ratio, enjoy de facto self-govern­
ment. By this logic, there is no 
need for official legislation regarding 
Inuit self-government since, for all 
practical purposes, this goal has 
already been attained. In addition, 
as we have seen, Ottawa has com­
mitted a considerable amount of 
money to create the new territory 
and contributes largely to its yearly 
budget. The federal government is 
not interested in investing additional 
sums of money to create some sort 
of as yet undefined Inuit self-gov- 
ernment in Nunavut.
For Inuit leaders, however, the 
establishment of Nunavut has noth­
ing to do with Inuit self-govern­
ment. Without defining precisely 
what shape Inuit self-government 
would take in the context of 
Nunavut, Inuit are adamant on the 
fact that one must distinguish 
between a non-ethnic public govern­
ment such as the one presently 
administering the territory and a 
system of Inuit self-government 
based on ethnicity, in which only 
Inuit could vote and be represented.
For now, the Inuit feel confident 
that, because of their demographic 
majority, they will control Nunavut’s 
economic, social and political agen­
da. However, what would happen if 
in the future Inuit were to become a 
minority within Nunavut?
A  M o d e l  f o r  A u t o n o m y
Nunavut’s legislators must come 
to terms with these and other issues 
in the months and years ahead. 
Nunavut has marked nearly two 
years of existence, but the questions 
raised here remain unanswered. 
Nunavut will not be a panacea for 
the socioeconomic malaise affecting
today’s Inuit society; at best, the 
new territorial government will 
allow Inuit to take into their own 
hands their social, economic and 
political destinies, enabling them to 
better stand up to tomorrow’s chal­
lenges.
The establishment of the Nunavut 
Territory gives the Inuit of the cen­
tral and eastern Canadian Arctic a 
unique opportunity to create poli­
cies and institutions based on Inuit 
traditions and customs. The territo­
ry also gives the Inuit a greater voice 
within the broader Canadian agen­
da, especially in cases in which 
Canada is involved in negotiating 
international conventions that 
might affect Inuit interests. For 
example, Canada would be hard 
pressed to negotiate any internation­
al accord that could affect Inuit har­
vesting rights in the Arctic without 
prior consultations with the 
Nunavut government.
Finally, the regional political 
autonomy enjoyed by the citizens of 
Nunavut could inspire other Inuit 
groups to seek similar political pow­
ers. Like today’s Greenland, 
Nunavut could come to symbolize a 
form of Inuit government arrange­
ment within nation-states that may 
serve as a political model for other 
Inuit groups in Russia and in 
Alaska, as well as minority ethnic 
groups in other countries.
Andre Legare is completing his Ph.D. 
in the Department o f  Geography at 
Queen’s University in Kingston, 
Ontario.
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Northern Jurisdiction
by Ailsa Henderson
T he Nunavut Act and Nunavut Land Claims Agreement of 1993 was the largest land claim settlement in Canadian history. Along with the 
Nunavut Political Accord, it marked 
the beginning of the development 
of Canadas third territory,
Nunavut, officially established in 
April 1999. These events are 
remarkable not only for the quanti­
ties of land they involve and the 
flexibility they allow within the 
political organization of the 
Canadian federation, but also for 
the lessons they provide for other 
culturally distinct regions seeking to 
obtain greater political autonomy. 
The creation of new institutions 
allows for attempts to correct the 
biases and unpopular practices of 
former structures and rebuild the 
often negative relationship between 
citizens and the state. The 
approach toward political develop­
ment in Nunavut is an example of 
how one federation has attempted 
to adapt to the diverse cultural pop­
ulations within its borders.
The Nunavut Territory does not 
offer aboriginal self-government in 
strict terms, but to many observers, 
it adds up to de facto self-determi­
nation for the Inuit population.
The Land Claim Agreement and 
the Political Accord, and the institu­
tions established to ensure their 
implementation, must come to 
terms with the particular demands 
of political life in a northern, geo­
graphically extended region. They 
must also take into account Inuit 
cultural demands, which may con­
flict with the interests of other resi-
An inukshuk adorns Nunavut’s landscape. These stone cairns, in the form  o f  a 
human being, are built by the Inuit as landmarks on a treeless landscape. Photo: 
Andre Legare.
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*
The f la g  o f  Nunavut feautures the inukshuk and the North Star.
dents of Nunavut. The resulting 
tensions will dictate much of the 
future success of the territorial gov­
ernment and of Nunavut itself.
A s s ig n in g  J u r is d i c t io n
Situated in the eastern portion of 
Canada’s north, Nunavut represents 
approximately 20% of Canada’s 
land mass and 60% of the former 
Northwest Territories. It contains 
two-thirds of Canada’s coastline and 
four time zones (although only 
three are used). These vast reaches 
are home to less than 30,000 inhab­
itants, more than 80% of whom are 
Inuit. The territory is defined by 
three regions—Qikiqtaaluk-Baffin 
(east and north), Kivalliq-Keewatin 
(south and central, near Hudson 
Bay) and Kitikmeot (central and 
western)—which in turn contain 28 
communities. The largest of these 
is the capital, Iqaluit, with a popula­
tion of 4,500. Due to the large
proportion of Inuit inhabitants, 
Inuktitut is one of the official lan­
guages of the new territory, along 
with English and French.
According to the 1996 Canadian 
census, the rate of population 
growth in Nunavut far outstrips 
that of the Northwest Territories 
and the rest of Canada. At the 
same time, education levels are sig­
nificantly lower. Well over half the 
Nunavut population is under 25 
and lacks a high school diploma. 
High levels of unemployment and 
demand for services for younger 
people were a persistent obstacle to 
development in the Yellowknife- 
centered Northwest Territories.
Such demographic demands, in 
addition to the geographic expanse 
of the region and the cultural par­
ticularity of the Inuit, dictated 
many of the provisions of the 
Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, 
which covers Inuit title to land, and
the Nunavut Act, which establishes 
the structure of government in the 
new territory.
The structure of the Nunavut 
government does not differ signifi­
cantly from that of the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories, and constitu­
tionally the division of power is 
similar. This resemblance is not 
surprising, given that the Nunavut 
Act was modeled on the Northwest 
Territories Act. Despite the resem­
blance, however, Nunavut, by virtue 
of its origins as a land claims settle­
ment, occupies a unique place in 
the Canadian federation. Through 
the Land Claims Agreement, 
Nunavut gained decision-making 
capacity in areas of jurisdiction nor­
mally reserved for the federal gov­
ernment.
Ottawa began to heed demands 
for self determination and develop 
strategies for dealing with the vast 
distances within the Northwest 
Territories in the 1970s. Efforts to 
address the issues of aboriginal land 
titles and cultural and linguistic 
protection for the Inuit sparked an 
interest in resolving the land dis­
putes in the area. The Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement was the 
product of decades of negotiations. 
Among other provisions, it recog­
nized Inuit title to approximately
350,000 square km of land and ear­
marked close to US$1.5 billion in 
federal money for the area over a 
period of 14 years. It also granted 
the Inuit royalties from oil, gas and 
mineral development on Crown 
land, hunting and fishing rights, 
and a role in environmental protec­
tion. The deal acknowledged the 
goal of greater participation of Inuit
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Nunavut parliament building, Iqaluit. Photo: Andre Legare.
firms in the Nunavut economy and 
the need for training and education 
of Inuit peoples, as well as hiring 
practices that would reflect the 
majority Inuit proportion of the 
population. In exchange, the Inuit 
signed away future claims to rights 
and title on the land.
The Land Claims Agreement, 
which contains limited provisions 
for the future political development 
of the territory, was created in con­
junction with the Nunavut Act, a 
political accord which governs all 
individuals within the boundaries of 
Nunavut, not just the Inuit. In 
addition to the goal of proportional 
representation within the civil serv­
ice, the Nunavut Act included rep­
resentation for the Inuit, territorial 
and federal governments in institu­
tions dealing with federal jurisdic­
tion in the territories.
The legislation further provided 
for the creation of two bodies, the 
Nunavut Implementation 
Commission (NIC) and a remod­
eled Nunavut Tunngavik 
Incorporated (NTI). Granted the 
power to make by-laws and tem­
porarily in charge of the Nunavut 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, the 
NIC eased the transition phase 
between the political agreement and 
the first elected government. The 
NTI has a slightly different mission; 
a private corporation designed to 
ensure that the land claims agree­
ment is carried out in a manner that 
best represents the interests of the 
Inuit, it attempts to protect com­
munity principles of self-reliance 
and cultural and social well-being. 
The distinction between the NIC 
and NTI is between a public body 
and an ethnic one, mirroring the 
distinction between the political 
accord and the land claims agree­
ment.
P o l it ic a l  P r o v is io n s
Under the Nunavut Act, the terri­
tory maintains control over matters 
that relate to the working of the leg­
islature, the licensing and importing 
of intoxicants, local and municipal 
matters, direct taxation, language, 
hospitals, land, property and agri­
culture, and justice (both civil and 
criminal), including courts and pris­
ons. The territory is not permitted 
to restrict the rights of First Nations 
peoples or Inuit with respect to 
hunting or trapping. Nothing with­
in the act is to be interpreted as 
granting the legislature greater pow­
ers than those provided in the 
Canadian Constitution.
By virtue of its role as a territory 
and former shared jurisdiction with 
the Northwest Territories, Nunavut 
displays a considerable overlap of 
institutions. Some bodies, such as 
the Water Management Board, con­
tain members from both territories. 
In other cases, membership is 
shared among three different territo­
ries. For example, members of the 
Supreme Court of the Yukon and 
Northwest Territories are automati­
cally members of the Nunavut 
Supreme Court. There is also a 
degree of overlap with the Canadian 
government. The Auditor General 
of Canada, for example, is also the 
Auditor General of Nunavut. But it 
is the way in which the areas of 
jurisdiction and limitations have 
been interpreted in Nunavut that 
stands as a testament to the NIC’s 
efforts to respond to the cultural 
and geographic demands of the ter­
ritory. A new, “single-level trial 
court system” will affect the admin­
istration and dispensing of justice in 
the territory. The government also 
boasts streamlined structures that 
eliminate the regional councils of 
education and Board of Health.
These structural influences co­
exist within the broader political 
culture of the north. The current 
Nunavut legislature, and its previ­
ous incarnation as the Northwest 
Territories legislature, are the only 
assemblies without political parties.
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Candidates run as independents, a 
fact with significant ramifications 
not only for cost and ease of cam­
paigning, but also for the degree of 
consensus exercised in the daily 
working culture of the assembly. 
During the campaign, one of the 
candidates for premier, Goo 
Arlooktoo, complained that the lack 
of political parties made it difficult 
to distinguish political preferences 
among candidates. According to 
the Northwest Territories govern­
ment, the consensus form of gov­
ernment is closer to traditional abo­
riginal ways of arriving at decisions. 
It was in this institutional and cul­
tural context that Nunavut voters 
elected their new government.
Residents of Nunavut have been 
to the polls frequently in the last 10  
years. Voting has decided three 
plebiscites on the Land Claims 
Agreement, the offer of twinned 
constituencies to ensure gender par­
ity, and the location of the territo­
ry’s capital. Elections in February
1999 selected the 19 members of 
the Nunavut Legislative Assembly. 
Voter turnout was 8 8 %, and the 
choice was between 71 candidates,
11 of whom were women. The 
redrawing of electoral boundaries in 
the neighboring Northwest 
Territories, a formal apology for 
past injustices from the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, and 
plans to ensure a continued market 
for the seal hunt were among the 
political issues raised during the 
campaign. Following the election, 
the members of the legislative 
assembly (18 men and one woman) 
elected Paul Okalik as premier.
The new government has 1 0  
departments that address issues 
ranging from sustainable develop­
ment to culture, language, elders 
and youth. Seven men, including 
the premier, share the burden of 
these portfolios. In an effort to 
adapt to the needs of a vast and
diverse territory, departments and 
agencies of the government will be 
established throughout Nunavut in 
addition to occupying offices in 
Iqaluit. In accordance with the 
principles of the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement, NTI, Arctic 
College, the Department of Indian 
Affairs and the government of the 
Northwest Territories have all been 
involved in training personnel for 
the demands of government and 
business in the new territory.
C h a l l e n g e s  A h e a d
In its first report, entitled 
Footprints in New Snow, the NIC 
highlighted some of the issues fac­
ing the people of Nunavut. While 
reiterating the goals that the new 
government and its civil service be 
representative and cost efficient 
while maintaining the territory’s 
cultural distinctiveness, the report 
noted that popular expectations— 
whether unrealistically high or 
low—could damage the ability of 
the new legislature to perform effec­
tively.
Many key issues involve the geo­
graphic and cultural particularity of 
the new territory. Voters and candi­
dates in the 1999 elections identi­
fied the high unemployment rate, 
economic regeneration and oppor­
tunities for youth as particular areas 
of concern. Poor housing and serv­
ice infrastructure, a cost of living 
one and a half times higher than in 
Canada’s southern provinces, and 
high levels of suicide and substance 
abuse are also worthy of special 
attention. At the local level, com­
plaints about poor sidewalks and lit­
ter in Iqaluit co-exist with concern 
over the centralization of power in 
Rankin Inlet and the capital. Other 
issues presented themselves after the 
election. New commissioner Helen 
Maksagak, for example, pledged in 
her throne speech to make Nunavut 
a single time zone.
Among the major areas of con­
cern, and one highlighted consis­
tently by the NTI, is protection of 
the cornerstones of Inuit identity: 
culture and language. Recent data 
from Statistics Canada show that 
almost half of the population has 
engaged in what are broadly defined 
as traditional activities, but that 
most of this involvement is limited 
to hunting. Twenty-three percent 
report some participation in tradi­
tional crafts, and only 7 .6 % in trap­
ping. In addition, one-quarter of 
Nunavut’s population speaks 
English at home. In an effort to 
strengthen the indigenous lan­
guage’s place in society, the legisla­
tive assembly voted to conduct 
much of the government’s work in 
Inuktitut.
Self-determination and political 
autonomy are powerful goals and 
popular phrases. Asymmetrical fed­
erations such as Spain and recent 
constitutional developments in 
Great Britain highlight the efforts 
being made in many parts of the 
world to ensure that political insti­
tutions are responsive to the popu­
lations closest to them. These 
examples not only suggest that the 
goal of political renewal is a popular 
one, but that culturally or ethnically 
distinct populations are able to gain 
greater control over their political 
destinies than regions lacking mark­
ers of distinction. By attempting to 
create political institutions more 
responsive to the needs of its Inuit 
residents, the government of 
Nunavut must balance the cultural 
needs of the majority while meeting 
the political needs of all residents. 
The ability to navigate this dual 
mandate will determine much of 
the future success of Nunavut. ■
Ailsa Henderson is a lecturer in the 
Department o f  Politics and Centre o f  
Canadian Studies at the University o f  
Edinburgh.
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by Sarah Corona Berkin
San Miguel Huaixtita is a mountain village in the Sierra Madre Occidental, in the northern part of the Mexican state of Jalisco.
It has a population of approximate­
ly 710 Huichol Indians. The vil­
lage has no electricity, advertising, 
billboards, newspapers or even full- 
length mirrors. Inside and out, the 
walls of the houses are usually left 
blank; ordinary decorations, such 
as calendars and photographs, are 
rare. The same is true of the vil­
lage’s schools and kaliguey, or holy 
places, which are unadorned by 
images. The only Western images 
San Miguel Huaixtita’s residents see 
are the illustrations in children’s 
school books, photographs brought 
by the occasional visitor, or the 
labels on the few packaged goods 
for sale in the village store.
What happens to the act of see­
ing in a community where there 
are no images? Do people look at 
each other differently? What is the 
relationship between the a-iconic 
glance and the universe that sur­
rounds the Huichol?
These were some of the ques­
tions I hoped to answer in San 
Miguel Huaixtita. The following 
photos are the product of a 
research project undertaken at the 
Tatusi Maxakwaxi (Our 
Grandfather Deer Tail) secondary 
school. The school’s 100 students 
were each given a disposable cam­
era with enough film to take 27 
pictures. They were briefly 
instructed in the use of the camera, 
including such tips as the impor­
tance of keeping the lens clean and 
not pointing directly at the sun.
After one week, the film was devel­
oped and returned to the students. 
Some participated in one-on-one 
interviews in which they were 
asked to classify and comment on a 
selection of photographs. Their 
responses, along with observations 
made during the author’s extended 
stay in the community, yield some 
clues about how the Huichol of 
San Miguel Huaixtita view each 
other and the world.
As a form of communication, 
images reflect trends in contempo­
rary society. We live in the era of 
the close-up, a point of view that 
privileges the human face. In 
Western culture, the face has 
become the locus of all drama.
This emphasis has produced a cer­
tain stereotyping of emotional 
expression, a sentimentalism and 
an aesthetic in which images 
manipulate our moods. In con­
trast, the Huichol photographs are 
rarely close-ups. They contain a 
wealth of minute and varied detail. 
Their austere poses and panoramic 
views allow us to see complete 
worlds instead of being made to 
feel subjective impressions.
Another way in which the 
Huichol photographs differ from 
Western images is in the use they 
make of the horizon. Western cul­
ture has compressed its line of 
vision, influenced largely by the 
optical illusions and images broad­
cast on television. Does this new 
perspective—up close, without a 
horizon or depth of field—imply 
an impoverishment of our vision? 
Feliciano, a Huichol teacher, 
offered this opinion: “The Huichol 
have eagle eyes__Eagles are clever
T O
and shrewd; they see everything in 
panorama.”
Unlike Western amateur photog­
raphers, the Huichol photogra­
phers do not generally use people 
or objects as their central vantage 
points. Instead, the camera is 
adjusted so that people or animals 
are integrated into the landscape. 
They may appear to the left or to 
the right of the center so as not to 
obscure a house, mountain or 
stone that forms part of the back­
drop. Just as in oral communica­
tion, signs are not separated from 
their origins. Whereas written and 
electronic forms of communication 
send us spinning across space and 
time, the Huichol photographs 
represent an instance in which the 
body and the voice—or in this 
case, the body and the eye—come 
together to produce a harmonious 
whole.
The discovery of a symbolic rela­
tionship between indigenous peo­
ples and the land should come as 
no surprise. For centuries, land 
and the question of its ownership 
have been the most important fac­
tors in the survival of indigenous 
communities. Conflicts over land 
have produced violent clashes 
between Indians, Europeans and 
mestizos. The disputes have their 
root in differing concepts of the 
relationship between nature and 
culture. For Westerners, nature 
and culture are separate and exist 
in opposition to each other; for the 
Huichol, the two depend on one 
another.
The Western world’s image-based 
culture has produced a pathology 
of perception. In the words of
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Paul Virilio, “sight is no longer the 
possibility of seeing, but the 
impossibility of not seeing.”
Among the Huichol, this syndrome 
is known as nierikarriya, a state in 
which a person loses the ability to 
see and believes in a false image of 
him- or herself. Comparing the 
worlds of image and vision allows 
us to glimpse the intersection of 
different cultural constructs. To do 
so, we must adopt a critical theory 
of vision that stands apart from the 
trend toward globalization and cul­
tural homogenization, emphasizing 
instead the diversity of visual sub­
jectivities and the points at which 
glances converge and diverge. ■
Sarah Corona Berkin is a professor 
in the Department o f  Communica­
tion Studies a t the University o f  
Guadalajara, Mexico.
Among Mexican indigenous peoples, 
the Huichol have one o f  the lowest 
rates o f  Spanish-language proficiency. 
Twenty-five percen t o f  Huichol speak 
their own language exclusively. Most 
also practice other religions besides 
Christianity. Only 48% o f  Huichol 
claim to be Christians, compared to 
91 % o f  other Mexican indigenous 
groups. The community o f  San 
M iguel Huaixtita is organized 
around traditional authorities and  
religious rituals.
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The photographs in the sample reveal 
a special handling o f  the concept o f  
space and the human form  within the 
pictures’ boundaries. Most o f  the 
photos are taken straight on, with 
almost no close-ups (two out o f  
2700). The photos make a special 
effort to show context; in both poses 
and action shots, the subjects are 
shown in the midst o f  their surround­
ings. The fo cu s shifts to the left or to 
the right as needed to accommodate a 
complete image.
When posing subjects in fr on t o f  their 
homes, the photographers take care to 
include the building in its entirety 
and afford a view  o f  the background 
scenery. The camera may be poin ted  
upwards to capture mountains in the 
distance, or subjects are posed  at the 
intersection o f  walls or fen ces to take 
in both sides o f  the landscape.
When the photographers are inside a 
dwelling, they open a window to g e t  
a view  o f  the outside. I f  they are out­
side, they open doors to g e t  a glimpse 
inside the house.
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The posed  photographs depict the sub­
j e c t  straight on, with the arms at the 
sides and a serious expression or slight 
smile. The fo rm a l pose is fa r  from  
the w ide grins characteristic o f  
Western media and advertisements.
Most subjects are posed  standing or 
seated on stones or the bare earth. It 
is no coincidence that this image— 
with its fa r  more relaxed pose—is o f  
the only mestizo ch ild  in the commu­
nity. The boy’s father, who works as a 
bricklayer in coastal Nayarit, sent his 
son to live with relatives in San 
M iguel Huaixtita.
The subject almost always gazes directly into the camera. The larger sample o f  
photos reveals some exceptions: Men wearing mestizo clothing often p la ce their 
hands in their pockets.
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Most shots are posed outdoors. The 
Huichol attach great importance to 
context and surroundings, which usu­
ally take precedence over the action in 
the foreground.
The human form  is always presented  
as a whole, never fragm ented or shot 
in close-up. “I  don’t like bits o f  skirt 
and pieces o f  feet, ” commented one 
youn g man. Huichol textiles and  
handcrafts fo llow  the same conven­
tion, except fo r  those that depict the 
fa ces o f  the gods. “This is the way 
you  see the deer, with peyote, only its 
fa ce, ” said local resident Daniel 
Castro, describing a wool pan el he 
designed. The implication is that 
only the gods appear without form ; 
human beings must always inhabit a 
body.
The geographical context, form s o f  
econom ic activity and  oral methods o f  
communication a ll play a pa rt in the 
messages conveyed by the photographs. 
This shot shows the setting fo r  San 
M iguel Huaixtita, 2200 meters 
above sea level in the Sierra Madre 
Occidental.
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The camera is adjusted to integrate peop le and animals into their surroundings. The resulting image has more weight than 
the subject itself, who may be posed  to the left or right so as not to obscure the landscape.
For the Huichol, nature and culture 
are a continuum; what affects one 
affects the other. The community’s 
ancestors are the gods o f  the earth. 
Natural phenom ena depend on 
humans and their relationship with 
these gods. This may explain the care 
with which the Huichol photogra­
phers fram e subjects in their sur­
roundings.
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Memory and Identity
by Marian Goslinga
A t a conference last year at Florida International University, noted Chilean author and human rights activist 
Marjorie Agosfn discussed the con­
cept of memory in the works of 
Latin American women writers. 
Agosfn pointed out that in the fic­
tion of many of the region’s female 
authors, the ability to remember the 
past creates a sense of engagement 
and continuity. Their works are 
characterized by a sense that past 
experience—no matter how traumat­
ic—should be preserved with the 
same veneration awarded the present. 
As examples of this contemporary 
trend, she cited Claribel Alegrfa (El 
Salvador) and Elena Poniatowska 
(Mexico).
In the case of Caribbean women 
writers, the concept of “memory” is 
invigorated, to a certain extent, by 
the issue of race. In all four major 
language areas of the region— 
English, Spanish, French and 
Dutch—women use memory, 
whether collective or individual, to 
trace and return to the past in search 
of their true identity. They go back 
to the era of slavery, the legacy of an 
African homeland, and the invisible 
scars of displacement, captivity and 
exile to tell their story. Race is a 
powerful ingredient that is frequently 
reflected in the use of Creole as the 
language of choice. Indeed, race and 
language have become close allies in 
the quest for cultural identity in the 
Caribbean.
T h e  S e a r c h  f o r  R o o t s
In the first half of the twentieth 
century, a group of African and
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The works ofMaryse Conde
Within the context of the complex and trau­
matic West Indian heritage of slavery, colo­
nization and assimilation, Conde’s fictional 
characters search for an identity which 
reflects that of a larger community.
Caribbean students in Paris devel­
oped the theory of Negritude. At 
the core of this theory was the exal­
tation of an African cultural identi­
ty long repressed and despised in 
the West Indies, where the assump­
tion of white superiority over black 
was a basic tenet of the institution 
of slavery. A key proponent of 
Negritude was Aime Cesaire, a 
French Caribbean author from 
Martinique. His seminal 1939 
text, Cahier d ’un retour au pays 
natal (Return to My Native Land), 
gave poetic form to the yearning 
for reconciliation with ancestral 
Africa. This searing text became 
the cornerstone of modern 
Francophone West Indian litera­
ture, and Cesaire’s theme of black 
cultural exile was embraced by writ­
ers from all parts of the Caribbean.
Within just a few decades, how­
ever, critics challenged the privi­
leged position which Cesaire 
accorded to Africa in his works—a 
step intended as a corrective to 
Europe’s dismissal of African civi­
lization—on the grounds that it 
encouraged West Indians to bypass 
their own countries in their quest 
for spiritual roots. In 1958, anoth­
er French Caribbean academic, 
Edouard Glissant, proposed the
concept of Antillanite instead. This 
theory offered another interpreta­
tion of cultural identity, one more 
attuned to geographical reality and 
historical truth. Viewing the recov­
ery of African identity as a practical 
impossibility due to the interven­
ing, alienating centuries of slavery, 
Glissant preferred to focus his 
attention not on a distant, imag­
ined continent but on the real 
country of his birth, Martinique. 
Instead of an emotional affiliation 
with Africa, Antillanite sought to 
incorporate the history of the 
despised institution of slavery and 
all its accompanying evils.
Antillanite did not repudiate 
Negritude; instead, it adapted and 
adjusted it to conform to 
Caribbean reality. For Glissant, the 
real issue became one of authentica­
tion rather than denial. In found­
ing the journal Acoma in the early 
1970s, he initiated a forum for live­
ly psychological and socioeconomic 
debate about the new doctrine and 
its implications for the French 
Caribbean.
C a r ib b e a n  C o m p l e x it ie s
The cultural transition from 
Negritude to Antillanite can per­
haps be traced most clearly in the
works of Maryse Conde, an author 
from Guadeloupe who is one of the 
Caribbean’s most prolific and com­
plex writers. As a black Caribbean 
woman novelist, Conde not only 
highlights the tensions in 
Caribbean culture between tradi­
tional and modern values, but also 
those existing among ethnic groups 
and between the sexes. She com­
bines a representative view of a 
Caribbean writer’s specific concerns 
with a postmodern view of litera­
ture as multicultural, polymor­
phous intersection. For Conde, the 
concept of memory—an integral 
part of Antillanite—is of the 
utmost importance as she carefully 
weaves together personal experi­
ences and meticulous historical 
documentation to develop plot and 
style in her fiction. Within the 
context of the complex and trau­
matic West Indian heritage of slav­
ery, colonization and assimilation, 
her fictional characters search for 
an identity which reflects that of a 
larger community. From the per­
spective of a black woman in a geo­
graphically, culturally and political­
ly marginal world, Conde selfcon­
sciously attempts to represent the 
interrelated issues of race, gender 
and class.
Conde’s works may be divided 
into three distinct stages that 
chronicle her trajectory from 
Negritude to Antillanite. In the 
first stage of her writing, the influ­
ence of the former clearly domi­
nates. References to Africa are 
everywhere, and the return to the 
past is the main source of inspira­
tion. In Heremakhonon (which 
ironically means “welcome home”
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in Malinke), and Une saison a 
Rihata (A Season in Rihata), 
Veronica and Marie-Helene, the 
female protagonists (both from 
Guadeloupe), search for their 
African roots. Veronica seeks in 
Africa an elusive sense of belong­
ing, but finds instead a continent 
torn by violence, ambition, oppor­
tunism and lost hope. Marie- 
Helene, married to Zek and living 
in the sleepy African town of 
Rihata with their six daughters, 
becomes involved in a variety of 
intrigues, corruption and power 
struggles. Mirroring the antino­
mies of their colonial backgrounds, 
neither is able to define a role for 
herself on African soil or break free 
from a Western frame of reference.
The quest for the African past is 
also the main focus of Segou 
(Segu), the two-volume saga of the 
mythical eighteenth-century 
Bambara empire. In this award- 
winning bestseller, Conde recreates 
a high civilization in a precolonial 
Africa that practiced slavery well 
before the Europeans and had 
extensive contacts with the 
Christian and Islamic worlds.
After Segou, Conde entered the 
second stage of her writing by res­
olutely turning to the Americas 
and the African diaspora. Moi, 
Tituba, sorciere noire de Salem (I, 
Tituba, Black Witch of Salem), is 
the first in a series of fictional 
works set in the New World. The 
action takes place in the seven­
teenth century, in the puritanical 
society of colonial America and the 
sugarcane plantations of Barbados. 
The novel’s female protagonist, 
Tituba, tells the story of her escape 
from colonial and patriarchal 
forces. Conde uses this first-person 
narrative to rewrite the history of 
the Caribbean from a woman-cen- 
tered point of view.
In La vie scelerate (The Tree of 
Life), Conde goes a step further
and returns to Guadeloupe where, 
as she has stated in interviews, she 
comes to terms with her quest and 
finds peace with herself. In this 
stage of her development, she 
becomes convinced that being 
black is no longer a historical 
appendage but an ideological con­
struct. In a critique of Negritude, 
she writes, “The black man does 
not exist. A Europe anxious to 
legitimize its exploitation created 
him.” La vie scelerate, based on the 
“memories” of Conde’s own family, 
is a multicultural narrative which 
explores the historical and cultural 
significance of race, gender and 
class relationships in different parts 
of the Americas—Panama, the 
United States, Jamaica, Haiti—and 
France. Using “memory” against 
the backdrop of the slave-like con­
ditions of the building of the 
Panama canal, Conde raises unre­
lenting questions of exile, estrange­
ment from the motherland, rela­
tions to “others” in the diaspora 
and to whites, and a return to 
roots.
In what is perhaps her most cele­
brated novel, Traversee de la man­
grove  (Crossing the Mangrove), 
Conde presents the reader with 
another vision of her native 
Guadeloupe, marking the third 
stage of her quest for a separate 
identity and the culmination of her 
affiliation with Antillanite. Set at a 
wake, the novel explores the diverse 
voices of the community and sug­
gests the impossibility of retrieving 
a collective “memory.” The myste­
rious figure of the dead man and 
the solemn backdrop of the wake 
provide Conde with the crucial 
tools to formalize the quest for 
identity within a typical Caribbean 
framework.
In La colonie du nouveau monde, 
published in 1993, Conde returns 
to the same themes—African her­
itage, the destructive consequences
of colonialism, the concept of 
alienation—and other aspects that 
keep the Caribbean locked in a dis­
crete space. In a review of the 
novel by Bettina Anna 
Soestwohner, Conde is quoted as 
saying that her definition of cre­
ativity is to wander—both in terms 
of geography and the exploration 
of cultural and historical heritage.
P e r ip h e r a l  V o ic e s
Marjorie Agosfn has argued that 
women writers are often on the 
front line of efforts to better 
women’s lives in Latin America. 
Perhaps nowhere is this more true 
than in the French Caribbean, 
where the island of Guadeloupe 
alone has produced such authors as 
Maryse Conde and Simone 
Schwarz-Bart. Given their unique 
perspectives on questions of race, 
class, gender and geography, 
Caribbean women authors can pro­
vide invaluable insights into the 
evolution of a sense of separate 
identity in a historically peripheral 
region. The documentation of a 
controversial and illusionary multi­
disciplinary concept such as “iden­
tity” is rife with contradictions and 
has not, as yet, been successfully 
completed for the Caribbean. 
Resources are especially scarce 
when it comes to the Caribbean 
and women—both subjects tradi­
tionally neglected in US academic 
circles. ■
Marian Goslinga is the Latin 
American and Caribbean bibliogra­
ph er at Florida International 
University. This article was fir s t p re­
sented at the 1999 Seminar on the 
Acquisition o f  Latin American 
Materials (SALAM) in Nashville, 
Tennessee.
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International Trade Negotiation 
Skills Course
JANUARY 29-FEBRUARY 9, 2001 
SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS CENTER
Latin American and Caribbean Center
in association with
Centro de Estudios de Integracion Economica y  Comercio Internacional
The International Trade Negotiation Skills Course, organized by the Summit of the Americas Center at Florida 
International University and the Centro de Estudios de Integracion Economica y  Comercio Internacional of Buenos 
Aires, Argentina, will take place from January 29-February 9, 2001 in Miami, Florida.
The two-phase practical program is taught in Spanish over an intense two-week period. The first week will be an ori­
entation to the theoretical and practical themes involved in multilateral negotiations, with special emphasis on the 
current Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) hemispheric trade negotiation process. During the second week, 
course attendees will participate in practical role-playing negotiation exercises based on a real multilateral trade case 
from the hemisphere.
This course was created in response to the need for greater understanding and better management of the process of 
hemispheric economic integration. It is designed for official government negotiators from the region, for business and 
private sector individuals who will be affected by this process, and for academics and other professionals interested 
in regional integration and international negotiations.
The course instructors are trade specialists from several countries in Latin America as well as the U.S., with extensive 
and direct experience in hemispheric integration, international trade negotiations and academia. This initial 2001 
course will be taught in Spanish; however, given the high level of interest expressed, in the future we expect to pres­
ent the course in English, as well.
For more information please contact:
Summit of the Americas Center
Florida International University
University Park, DM 353
Miami, Florida, 33199, USA
Tel: 305 348 2894/Fax: 305 348 3593
E-mail: summit@fiu.edu
Web: www.americasnet.net
Centro de Estudios de Integracion 
Economica y Comercio Internacional
Callao 1975 - 10° “A”
C1024AAF Buenos Aires, Argentina 
Tel/Fax: 54 11 4816 6525 
E-mail: f-integral@sinectis.com.ar 
Web: www. f- i n tegral. co m
t h e  m o s t  f r e q u e n t l y  s p o t t e d  
B I R D  T H R O U G H O U T  L A T I N  A M E R I C A .
No other airline in the world offers more travel options to Latin America than we do. Now with 
over 100 flights every business day to 33 cities in 18 countries throughout Mexico, Central and  
South America. From six major U.S. cities. 4^s always, ^A dvan tage® travel awards program  
members can earn mileage credit every tim e they fly . So whether yo u ’re flying to Latin America fo r  business 
or pleasure, fly  the airline that's leading the way. For details, call your Travel Agent or American at 1-800-433-7300 
or visit us on the web at www.aa.com Consulte a su agente de viajes ^  ^
o llame gratis a Am erican Airlines a l 1-800-633-3711 en espanol. Something special to Latin America’
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American Airlines and AAdvantage are registered trademarks o f American Airlines, Inc. American Airlines reserves the right to change AAdvantage program rules, regulations, travel awards 
and special offers at any time without notice, and to end the AAdvantage program with six months notice. AAdvantage travel awards, mileage accrual and special offers are subject 
to governm ent regulations. American Airlines is not responsible fo r  products or services offered by other participating companies. Schedules subject to change without notice.
